Utopia or Reality? The Implementation of a Human Rights-Based Approach to the New Partnership for Africa's Development by Kalla, Britt
Utopia or Reality?
The Implementation of a Human Rights-Based Approach
to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
A thesis
submitted in fulfilment 
of the requirements for the Degree
of
Masters of Arts in Political Science
at the
University of Canterbury
by
Britt Kalla
University of Canterbury
2006
iv
Acknowledgements
Many individuals have contributed to the completion of this thesis, on the personal side 
as well as on the academic side, and I am indebted to all of them. Regarding the for-
mer, my acknowledgements go to the following persons. First and foremost, I would 
like to express gratitude to my parents who, each in their own way, have made my 
studies abroad a reality. Without their support and understanding, I would have never 
even reached New Zealand. Secondly, another huge thank you goes to my brothers 
and sister. I am grateful to Kay who does so many thoughtful things for me. I am 
equally thankful to Lia and Nico who have never stopped wondering why I have to 
study so far away from home. Fortunately, despite my long time of absence, they have 
also never stopped loving me. Thirdly, I would like to show my appreciation to my two 
best friends at home, Yvonne and Jackie. I thank them for being there for me night and 
day and for always believing in me and in what I do, especially at times when I hesitate. 
The same goes for Hilary who has been a true friend and who has provided me with 
the most wonderful home. Last but not least, a very warm thank you to Dave who has 
handled my occasional ‘freak-outs’ with lots of love, sensitivity but also humour. I very 
much appreciate his having been there for me at all times.
On the academic side, again, my acknowledgements go to a number of persons. To 
begin with, I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Michael Barutciski who is 
extraordinarily knowledgeable and dedicated towards his work. He initially sparked my 
interest in human rights, and without him, I would never have chosen this course of 
study. It has now become my future. Secondly, a huge thank you goes to the Depart-
ment of Political Science and Communication at the University of Canterbury. I am very 
grateful for their excellent support during my studies, be it personal, logistical or schol-
arship-related. In addition, I highly appreciate their sympathy during my time of sus-
pension. I would also like to show my appreciation to the University of Canterbury and 
the Peace and Disarmament Education Trust for each awarding me a scholarship, de-
spite my status as international student. Moreover, a big thank you to the Writing And 
Study Skill Centre for their continuous support. Finally, I am indebted to Dr. Tanya Ogil-
vie-White who has been the best supervisor. She has been everything from helpful and 
caring to encouraging and challenging – a wonderful mix. No matter what I end up do-
ing, I hope to remember Tanya’s admirable attitude towards her students, her col-
leagues and her work.
vList of Acronyms and Abbreviations
AHSG Assembly of Heads of State and Government
AIDS acquired immune deficiency syndrome
AI Amnesty International
AIUSA Amnesty International USA
AU African Union
CCIC Canadian Council for International Cooperation
CP civil and political
ESC economic, social and cultural
FIDH International Federation for Human Rights
G8 Group of Eight (leading industrial nations): Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, USA
GERA Gender and Economic Reforms in Africa
HIPC highly indebted poor country
HIV human immune deficiency virus
HRW Human Rights Watch
HSGIC Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
IDA International Development Association
IFI international financial institution
IGO intergovernmental organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
LDC less developed country
MAP Millennium Africa Recovery Plan
NAI New African Initiative
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO nongovernmental organisation
OAU Organisation of African Unity
ODA official development assistance 
PRSP poverty reduction strategy paper
RBA rights-based approach
SAP structural adjustment programme
vi
SAPRIN Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
WHO World Health Organisation
WTO World Trade Organisation
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature 
vii
Abstract
The intention of this thesis is to assess the World Bank’s SAPs as the principal eco-
nomic impediment to implementing an RBA to NEPAD. This assessment is sought to 
contribute to calculating the feasibility for implementation. It is assumed that the RBA is 
the best approach currently available to further the significant cause of sustainable hu-
man, social and economic development in developing countries generally, and in Africa 
in particular. Sustainable development in Africa is recognised as an extremely signifi-
cant step in promoting peace and security on the continent and internationally. Various 
NGOs, development institutes and scholars have argued that NEPAD lacks an RBA to 
development. However, while the critics are many, the question has not been voiced as 
to the obstacles Africa and international society face in applying an RBA to NEPAD. In 
an attempt to narrow this gap, the World Bank’s SAPs are analysed.
It has been shown many times that adjustment programmes do not adhere to the hu-
man rights standards spelled out, in particular, in the articles of the ICESCR. In addi-
tion, SAPs fail to incorporate human rights principles such as participation and ac-
countability. Consequently, because SAPs are not based on international human rights 
standards and principles, they do not fulfil the requirements of an RBA to development. 
It follows that the approach cannot be applied to NEPAD as long as the World Bank’s 
SAPs fail to adhere to these standards and principles and, thus, lead to the violation of 
people’s human rights in developing countries. To reach a reasonable conclusion on 
the Bank’s current human rights practices, its employment of SAPs in developing coun-
tries is analysed. Moreover, David Held’s regime of liberal international sovereignty is 
examined and applied to this case. Both investigations discover independently of each 
other that the implementation of an RBA to NEPAD is unrealistic under the current cir-
cumstances. 
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1Chapter 1
1. Introduction
For a very long time, the disciplines of human rights and development were perceived
as two separate undertakings. Therefore, discourse on their interrelationship was
sparse. However, over the last decade there has been a growing convergence of these
two fields. Today, scholars increasingly argue that one cannot be advanced success-
fully without the other. United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, provides one of 
the most recent comments in his 2005 report “In Larger Freedom.” He argues that in 
the interconnected world in which we live, human rights and development cannot be 
comprehended as two separate subjects. Instead, they must be understood as parts of 
a whole that reinforce each other.1 Similarly, Peter Uvin maintains that human rights 
and development are useless if considered independently, for both develop meaning 
only when becoming integrated.2 This is so, Uvin explains, because “all worthwhile 
processes of social change are simultaneously rights based and economically 
grounded, and should be conceived of in such terms.”3
The incorporation of human rights into the practice of development can occur at stages 
of varying intensity, the highest level of integration being the so-called human rights-
based approach (RBA) to development.4 This approach has been defined on the web-
page of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) as “a 
conceptual framework for the process of human development that is normatively based 
on international human rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and 
protecting human rights.”5 More specifically, this approach incorporates the standards 
and principles of the international human rights system into the plans, policies and 
processes of development programming. Whereas the standards are those included in 
the international treaties and declarations, the major guiding principles contained in the 
RBA to development are participation, accountability, non-discrimination, empower-
1 See UN General Assembly, Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human 
Rights for All (New York: 21 March 2005), A/59/2005.
2 See Peter Uvin, Human Rights and Development (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2004), 122.
3 Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 122.
4 See Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 50. For a good overview on all the levels of integration of 
human rights into development see Peter Uvin’s book, Human Rights and Development.
5 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), “Rights-Based Approaches.” 
http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html (accessed February 1, 2005).
2ment and equity.6 Because of this strong integration of human rights into the develop-
ment sphere, Uvin states that the RBA constitutes a “fundamental rethinking of the en-
tire development practice: its ideology, its partners, its aims, its processes, its systems 
and procedures.”7
Undeniably, such a fundamental rethinking process will face a vast number of different 
obstacles, including technical, procedural, political, cultural, law-related and economic 
impediments, to name a few. Discovering these and providing possible ways for suc-
cessfully addressing them represents, thus, an important contribution to promote the 
cause of the RBA to development. It is acknowledged that the RBA will not be the solu-
tion to all problems experienced in the field of development. Yet, this thesis arises from 
the assumption that the RBA is the best approach currently available to further the sig-
nificant cause of sustainable human, social and economic development in developing 
countries generally, and in Africa in particular. Sustainable development in Africa is 
recognised as an extremely significant step to promote peace and security on the con-
tinent and internationally.
This thesis intends to assess the World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) as the principal economic obstacle to implementing the RBA to a specific de-
velopment programme: the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, also known as 
NEPAD. In the face of the continuing marginalisation of Africa from the globalisation 
process and due to the failure of economic strategies imposed by internal as well as 
external actors, in 2001 the African governments of South Africa, Senegal, Nigeria, 
Egypt and Algeria drafted NEPAD.8 This programme is the final incarnation of reform 
proposals advised over the years by African leaders. It translates the earlier ‘African 
Renaissance’ project into a policy concept.9 This proposed partnership between African 
countries and various developed states, particularly the Group of Eight (G8), aims pri-
marily at eradicating poverty and achieving sustainable growth on the African conti-
6 See Amparo Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners
(UNDP Nepal, August 2003), 12. UNHCHR, “Rights-Based Approaches.” 
http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html (accessed February 1, 2005).
7 Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 50.
8 See International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), A Human Rights Approach to the New Partner-
ship for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (Paris: FIDH, 
2004), 21-25.
9 See Henning Melber, “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development – Scope and Perspectives.” In The 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) – African Perspectives, Discussion Paper 16, 6-13 
(Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002), 6-7.
3nent.10 The NEPAD base document states that the resources needed to accomplish 
these goals, such as capital, technology and human skills are in plentiful supply. “What 
is required to mobilise these resources and to use them properly, is bold and imagina-
tive leadership that is genuinely committed to a sustained human development effort 
and poverty eradication, as well as a new global partnership based on shared respon-
sibility and mutual interest (emphasis added).”11 The G8, at the 2002 G8 summit in 
Kananaskis, Canada, responded to this document with the so-called Africa Action Plan. 
This plan was created to support the idea of NEPAD and to provide a solid basis for 
future cooperation between Africa and international society.12
While some aspects of this new initiative are laudable, NEPAD is being criticised by 
various sources for its lack of an RBA to development. Although NEPAD addresses the 
issue of human rights in sections of its partnership programme, this has been done 
insufficiently, without adhering to the aforementioned standards and principles that
constitute the RBA.13 This is due to the existence of a variety of impediments to imple-
menting such an approach to NEPAD. The major obstacle in the economic sphere is
the World Bank’s employment of SAPs. This particular hindrance is faced by Africa as 
well as international society, for both play an equally active part in the development and 
upholding of this programme. The intention of this thesis is the examination of this im-
pediment. This is followed by an assessment of the feasibility of implementing an RBA
to NEPAD. Together, these two steps form a significant contribution to advancing sus-
tainable human, social and economic development on the continent of Africa.
1.1 Definition of Key Terms
Due to the nature of the topic, the thesis employs a number of key terms. Because 
these can be described in various ways, it is helpful to provide the reader with a more 
10 See Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), The New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (Abuja: HSGIC, 23 October 2001), para. 1.
11 HSGIC, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), para. 6.
12 See Group of Eight (G8), G8 Africa Action Plan (Kananaskis: G8, 27 June 2002), 1. In this thesis, the 
term ‘international society’ refers to the meaning established by Hedley Bull. He explains that an interna-
tional society “exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, 
form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their 
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.” Hedley Bull, The Anarchical 
Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1995), 13.
13 See Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC), The New Partnership for Africa’s Devel-
opment (NEPAD): A Commentary (Ottawa: CCIC, 2002), 4-5. FIDH, A Human Rights Approach to the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 15-18. 
Bronwen Manby, “The African Union, NEPAD, and Human Rights: The Missing Agenda,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 26 (2004): 984. Rights and Democracy, Human Rights and Democratic Development in Africa: 
Policy Considerations for Africa’s Development in the New Millennium; In Preparation for the G8 Summit
(Montréal: Rights and Democracy, 2002), 1-2.
4precise definition of the terms as used in this thesis. Apart from the ‘human rights-
based approach to development,’ which has already been introduced and which will 
again be addressed in the following chapter, the other terms to be defined are: human 
rights; development; economic development; human development; social development; 
sustainable development; and the right to development.
1.1.1 Human Rights
Every definition of ‘human rights’ must bear in mind that this is a highly contested mat-
ter, different classifications existing in abundance. That said, it can be argued that hu-
man rights are the rights possessed by all people simply because they are human be-
ings, which is commonly known as the ‘universality’ of human rights.14 However, they 
are not just principles or values related to human dignity. They are legal guarantees 
providing claim-holders such as individuals and groups with entitlements and placing 
obligations on duty-bearers, the latter consisting mainly of states but also increasingly 
comprising intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and multinational corporations.15
As such, human rights are defined with reference to the international human rights dec-
larations and conventions including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political as well as on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (ICCPR and ICESCR respectively). The United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP) in a more emotive manner states that “human rights express our 
deepest commitments to ensuring that all persons are secure in their enjoyment of the 
goods and freedoms that are necessary for dignified living.”16
1.1.2 Development
The history of the word ‘development’ is a long and complicated one dating back to the 
18th century where it was used as a biological metaphor. In 1768 Justus Moser, the 
conservative founder of social history, employed the word ‘Entwicklung’ to refer to the 
gradual process of social change. He thereby shifted the earlier biological metaphor to 
the social sphere.17 Once the term had entered this sphere, the word ‘development’ 
went through many transformations and today has become a “mere algorithm whose 
14 See Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press., 2003), 1.
15 See Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 3.
16 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights 
and Human Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 16.
17 See Gustavo Esteva, “Development,” in The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power, 
ed. Wolfgang Sachs, 6-25 (Johannesburg: Witwaterstrand University Press, 1992), 8.
5significance depends on the context in which it is employed.”18 Also and similar to the 
expression of ‘human rights’, there exist a great number of different definitions regard-
ing this term. In its most general meaning, development can be defined as “a favour-
able change, a step from the simple to the complex, from the inferior to the superior, 
from worse to better.”19 Applied to the issue of development as it is used in this thesis, 
Gilbert Rist comes up with the following definition: “’Development’ consists of a set of 
practices, sometimes appearing to conflict with one another, which require – for the 
reproduction of society – the general transformation and destruction of the natural envi-
ronment and of social relations. Its aim is to increase the production of commodities 
(goods and services) geared, by way of exchange, to effective demand.”20 However, to 
obtain a rather concrete definition of the phrase, it is more useful to introduce the vari-
ous subcategories of the term development to differentiate its diverse meanings. 
1.1.3 Economic Development
‘Economic development’ largely refers to economic growth in terms of growth in per 
capita gross domestic product in countries to ensure the well-being of their popula-
tions.21 However, as Arjun Sengupta, the Independent Expert on the Right to Develop-
ment, notes, economic growth can be accompanied by augmented inequalities or dis-
parities and rising concentrations of wealth and economic power as well as the ignoring 
of human rights standards relating to economic, social and cultural (ESC) but also civil 
and political (CP) rights.22 Despite such criticisms that have existed for decades, Jack 
Donnelly declares that the definition of economic development “continues to dominate 
the economic, political and popular mainstreams.”23
1.1.4 Human Development
Regardless of the predominance of economic development thinking, there have been 
steady movements towards more people-centred development known mostly as ‘hu-
man development.’ Today, it plays an important role as the counterpart to economic 
development. The UNDP in its Human Development Report 2000 on Human Rights 
18 Esteva, “Development,” 10.
19 Esteva, “Development,” 10.
20 Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, (London: Zed Books, 
1997), 13.
21 See Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 194. UN Economic and Social Council, 
Arjun Sengupta, Review of Progress and Obstacles in the Promotion, Implementation, Operationalization, 
and Enjoyment of the Right to Development (Geneva: 17 February 2004), E/CN.4/2004/WG.18/2, 4.
22 See Arjun Sengupta, “On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development,” Human Rights Quar-
terly 24 (2002): 848.
23 Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 194.
6and Human Development defines the term as follows: “Human development is the 
process of enlarging people’s choices, by expanding human functionings and capabili-
ties. Human development thus also reflects human outcomes in these functionings and 
capabilities. It represents a process as well as an end.”24 This definition draws on 
Amartya Sen’s book, Development as Freedom. There, he identifies development as 
the expansion of capabilities or, put differently, human freedoms to lead a dignified life 
of respect and value.25
Although human freedom is the purpose and motivation of human development, as it is 
of human rights, these two concepts are not one and the same. Both have as their 
common objective to secure basic freedoms but they do so through different models 
and coming from different traditions. While human rights are legal norms, which protect 
people from abuses and deprivations and which guarantee human freedoms, human 
development is a dynamic process of augmenting human capabilities to secure those 
freedoms.26 Hans-Otto Sano in his comparison between human rights and general de-
velopment theory states that differences “exist between the two traditions. Human 
rights has as its subject norms, rules and duties together with their institutional founda-
tions, whereas development theory has general processes of change, resource con-
trol/conflict, and resource allocation at its core.”27
1.1.5 Social Development
In 1995, heads of state gathered in Copenhagen, Denmark, for the World Summit for 
Social Development. Chapter 1 of the Programme of Action of this Summit states that 
“the ultimate goal of social development is to improve and enhance the quality of life of 
all people.”28 The Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development explains that social 
development addresses severe social problems including poverty, unemployment and 
social disintegration experienced by many countries.29 Therefore, the Declaration fur-
ther states that “the goals and objectives of social development require continuous ef-
forts to reduce and eliminate major sources of social distress and instability for the fam-
24 UNDP, Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and Human Development, 17.
25 See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 3. 
26 Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 8. UNDP, 
Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and Human Development, 2.
27 Hans-Otto Sano, “Development and Human Rights: The Necessary, but Partial Integration of Human 
Rights and Development,” Human Rights Quarterly 22 (2000): 741-742.
28 World Summit for Social Development, Report of the World Summit for Social Development, “Pro-
gramme of Action” (Copenhagen, 1995), A/CONF.166/9, ch. 1.
29 See World Summit for Social Development, Report of the World Summit for Social Development, “Co-
penhagen Declaration on Social Development” (Copenhagen, 1995), A/CONF.166/9, intro.
7ily and for society.”30 These comprise, among others, the following conditions: chronic 
hunger; malnutrition; illicit drug problems; organised crime; corruption; foreign occupa-
tion; armed conflicts; illicit arms trafficking; terrorism and xenophobia.31 Generally, so-
cial development can be achieved by focussing on values, objectives and priorities 
which enhance the well-being of people. Moreover, these issues strengthen and pro-
mote conducive institutions and policies.32
1.1.6 Sustainable Development
Similar to the general term of ‘development’ and the expression of ‘human develop-
ment’, the definition of ‘sustainable development’ has also changed over the years. As 
the United Nations Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) explains, 
the concept of sustainable development first emerged in the 1980s when it became 
apparent that there exists an important link between economic and social process and 
the environment together with the stewardship of natural resources.33 In 1987, the 
World Commission on Environment and Development in its publication Our Common 
Future defined sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.”34 The document Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living, pub-
lished in 1991 by the World Conservation Union, the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme and the World Wide Fund for Nature, complemented the definition presented 
by Our Common Future. It stated that sustainable development means “improving the 
quality of human life while living within the carrying capacity of supporting ecosys-
tems.”35 Finally, it can be said that the vision of sustainable development has expanded 
to viewing human and social aspects such as solidarity, equity, partnership and coop-
eration as being crucial to environmental protection.36 Related to this, UNESCO de-
clares: “By the time of the Johannesburg Summit in 2002 the vision broadened to en-
30 World Summit for Social Development, Report of the World Summit for Social Development, “Copenha-
gen Declaration on Social Development,” part A.
31 See World Summit for Social Development, Report of the World Summit for Social Development, “Co-
penhagen Declaration on Social Development,” part A.
32 See World Summit for Social Development, Report of the World Summit for Social Development, “Pro-
gramme of Action,” ch. 1.
33 See United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), “UN Decade for Edu-
cation for Sustainable Development (2005-2014),” http://unesco.org/education (accessed April 22, 2005).
34 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), 43.
35 International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP) and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable 
Living (Gland: World Conservation Union; UNEP; WWF, 1991), 10.
36 See UNESCO, “UN Decade for Education for Sustainable Development (2005-2014),” 
http://unesco.org/education (accessed April 22, 2005).
8compass social justice and the fight against poverty as key principles of development 
that is sustainable.”37
1.1.7 The Right to Development
When speaking of human rights, the notion exists that there are three different genera-
tions of rights. While CP rights belong to the first category of rights, ESC rights are part 
of the second generation of rights.38 Finally, there are rights of a third generation, the 
so-called solidarity rights, which include the right to peace, the right to environment and 
the right to development.39 The Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by 
the General Assembly in December 1986, defines this right in the following terms: “The 
right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human per-
son and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, 
social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms can be fully realized.”40 Referring to this sentence, Sengupta in his various 
UN reports and articles, explains that “the right to development relates to a process of 
development which leads to the realization of each human right and of all of them to-
gether and which has to be carried out in a manner known as rights-based.”41 In doing 
so, Sengupta points out the important fact that the right to development does not only 
have as its objective the fulfilment of human rights. Equally important, the right to de-
velopment refers to a process of development, which is also a human right.42
1.2 Rationale
Since the inauguration of NEPAD in October 2001, the amount of literature focussing 
on the lack of an RBA to this African development programme has steadily increased. 
Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International (AI) and Hu-
man Rights Watch (HRW), a number of development organisations and also academ-
ics and other professionals in the fields of human rights and development have criti-
cised NEPAD on this account.43 However, while the critics are many, the question has 
37 UNESCO, “UN Decade for Education for Sustainable Development (2005-2014),” 
http://unesco.org/education (accessed April 22, 2005).
38 See Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 14.
39 See N. J. Udombana, “The Third World and the Right to Development: Agenda for the Next Millennium,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 22 (2000): 761.
40 Declaration on the Right to Development. Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 41/128 on 4 De-
cember 1986.
41 Sengupta, “On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development,” 846.
42 See Sengupta, “On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development,” 851.
43 See Amnesty International USA (AIUSA), “Civil Society, Democracy, Human Rights and NEPAD: The 
Missing Links,” Testimony of Adotei Akwei, African Advocacy Director, Amnesty International USA before 
the U.S. House of Representatives Africa Subcommittee, September 18 2002, 
9not been voiced as to the obstacles Africa and the international society confront in im-
plementing an RBA to NEPAD. Yet, many hindrances exist. Among them are technical, 
political, law-related and economic impediments. In an attempt to address this question 
and, thus, narrow the gap, the economic impediment of the World Bank’s SAPs to such 
an approach to NEPAD is analysed. 
The results concerning the research on this principal economic obstacle will be of great 
significance to the human rights and development professionals and to academia. Most 
importantly, an examination of the contemporary literature reveals that following an 
RBA to development does have a series of advantages. This represents one of the key 
assumptions of the thesis and it will be further elucidated in the next chapter. Moreover, 
identifying and assessing this major economic hindrance will open up the opportunity to 
calculate the feasibility of implementing an RBA to NEPAD. In turn, this will contribute 
to promoting sustainable human, social and economic development on the African con-
tinent.
The reason for selecting the continent of Africa as the regional research focus is easy 
to justify. Africa has become the prime example of a continent whose interior problems 
become ever more internationalised, thus posing growing human security challenges to 
everyone. Conflicts spill over to neighbouring states, the spread of diseases is immune 
to any borders and the future consequences of sustained poverty are yet unknown. 
However, in an age of different global crises that increasingly engulf us all, can we any 
longer defend policies of strictly national interest as happens so often in the case of 
Africa? Despite the G8’s and other international donors’ commitment towards NEPAD 
and thus Africa as a whole, a certain degree of indifference is apparent at the same 
time. For example, Stefan Mair notes that politically and economically Africa is often 
seen as being of only trivial importance to many Western states. He also adds that in 
regard to international terrorism, Africa has not yet been perceived as a central object 
http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/107/akwe0918.htm (accessed October 23, 2004). CCIC, 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): A Commentary, 4-5. FIDH, A Human Rights 
Approach to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mecha-
nism (APRM), 15-18. Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Human Rights in Security and Development: Recom-
mendations for the G8 Summit, June 2002, including the G8’s Action Plan for Africa,” Background informa-
tion (New York: Human Rights Watch, 5 June 2002), 5. Manby, “The African Union, NEPAD, and Human 
Rights: The Missing Agenda,” 984. Rights and Democracy, Human Rights and Democratic Development in 
Africa: Policy Considerations for Africa’s Development in the New Millennium; In Preparation for the G8 
Summit, 1-2.
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of strategic interest.44 To draw the attention directly to NEPAD, as regards the G8’s 
Africa Action Plan to support NEPAD, a lack of concern is also evident. Referring to the 
G8’s progress report presented to the 2003 G8 summit in Evian, Bronwen Manby de-
clares that the report reads as if much has been accomplished, but in reality rhetoric 
remains paramount.45 She explains: “Action on debt relief, on ending agricultural or 
export subsidies, and on providing cheap drugs for treatment of HIV, has largely been 
blocked – with the European Union and the United States engaging in mutual mud-
slinging to shift the blame.”46 However, Cord Jacobeit points out that the West cannot 
afford a neighbouring continent, which is plagued by failing states, growing fundamen-
talism, a base for terrorists, illnesses and misery. Yet, globalisation also means that 
such developments cannot be contained.47 Therefore, he concludes: “Es gibt nicht nur 
eine moralisch-ethische Verpflichtung, Afrika in seiner ganzen faszinierenden (und 
auch abstoßenden) Vielfalt mit vergrößerten Anstrengungen beizustehen. Eine afrika-
nische Apokalypse kann sich der Westen aus wohlverstandenem Eigeninteresse nicht 
leisten.“48 (There is not just a moral-ethical responsibility to stand by this fascinating 
[and also repulsive] Africa with an increased effort. In terms of well-understood self-
interest, the West cannot afford an African apocalypse) (translation own). To follow 
Jacobeit’s call to stand by Africa with an increased effort is a further intention of this 
thesis. It is hoped that this work will contribute to a better understanding of the urgency 
for implementing an RBA to NEPAD. Only by doing so can the goal of African sustain-
able development be moved forward. This, in turn, will lead to an advanced state of 
peace and security in the region and beyond.
1.3 Theoretical Framework: The Regime of Liberal International Sovereignty
The theoretical framework employed derives mainly from David Held’s 2002 article 
“The Law of Peoples, The Law of States: Three Models of Sovereignty,” and the ex-
tended version of this article in his 2004 book Global Covenant: The Social Democratic 
Alternative to the Washington Consensus.49 The three models of sovereignty ad-
dressed in these works are classic sovereignty, liberal international sovereignty and 
44 See Stefan Mair, “Auflösung des Staatlichen Gewaltmonopols und Staatszerfall,” in Afrika – Ein Verlore-
ner Kontinent? (see bibliography), 100-101.
45 See Manby, “The African Union, NEPAD, and Human Rights: The Missing Agenda,” 996.
46 Manby, “The African Union, NEPAD, and Human Rights: The Missing Agenda,” 996-997.
47 See Cord Jacobeit, “Erscheinungsformen und Ursachen der ökonomischen Misere,” in Afrika – Ein Ver-
lorener Kontinent? (see bibliography), 96.
48 Jacobeit, “Erscheinungsformen und Ursachen der ökonomischen Misere,” 96. 
49 See David Held, “Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty,” Legal Theory 8 (2002): 
1-44. David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).
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cosmopolitan sovereignty. Classic sovereignty refers to the primacy of the state in the 
political and economic relations within and between countries and constitutes, thus, the 
law of states. Liberal international sovereignty represents a mixture of the law of states 
and the law of peoples. The political power of the state is delimited by the formation of 
various international regimes such as the international human rights regime and the 
establishment of international courts and other global institutions. These give increas-
ing power to the peoples by acknowledging their rights and, in turn, the state as a duty-
holder. The model of cosmopolitan sovereignty, finally, takes this thought one step fur-
ther, claiming that the possibility arises for states to ‘wither away’ as the main actors in 
international relations. Instead, they manifest themselves as just one powerful actor 
within an overarching cosmopolitan framework.50 As Held explains, in this model the 
laws and rules of the nation-state are not paramount anymore but become only one 
focus for legal progress, political deliberation and mobilisation.51 It is, therefore, the law 
of peoples.52
The present world order has the regime of liberal international sovereignty at its core. 
Held argues that one of the major deficiencies of the current order lies in the fact that 
massive inequalities of power and economic resources continue to increase. He par-
ticularly refers to the instances of poverty and marginalisation as examples.53 Held
rightfully asks: “Does this growing gulf in the life circumstances and life chances of the 
world’s population highlight intrinsic limits to the liberal international order?”54 The 
scholar answers the question himself. Although he admits that such trends as the par-
ticularisation of nation-states contribute to this disparity, Held believes that the principal 
source of this increasing inequality can be found elsewhere. He claims that the regime 
of liberal international sovereignty does not have an enormous impact on the regulation 
of economic power and market mechanisms. Instead, it is restricted to the curtailment 
of the abuse of political power in international relations. Consequently, there are no 
systematic means to deal with sources of economic power such as, for example, the 
international financial institutions (IFIs). 55 “Hence,” Held concludes, “it is hardly a sur-
50 See Held, “Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty,” 1.
51 See Held, “Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty,” 33.
52 See Held, “Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty,” 1.
53 See Held, “Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty,” 22. Held, Global Covenant: 
The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus, 142.
54 Held, “Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty,” 22. Held, Global Covenant: The 
Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus, 142.
55 See Held, “Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty,” 22. Held, Global Covenant: 
The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus, 143.
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prise that liberal democratic processes, human rights and flourishing economic ine-
qualities exist side by side.”56
The theoretical notions elucidated above are applied to this thesis. The question is ex-
plored whether the regime of liberal international sovereignty, in addition to the eco-
nomic obstacle of the World Bank’s SAPs, presents a major underlying impediment to 
implementing an RBA to NEPAD.
1.4 Methodology
To effectively comment on the methodology employed in this thesis, the author’s onto-
logical and epistemological position and the related theoretical perspective57 need to be 
introduced. They are the key elements on which the methodology is based. Therefore, 
such an outline gives the reader an idea of the writer’s justification of “choice and par-
ticular use of methodology and methods.”58 The ontological position taken in this pro-
ject is an anti-foundationalist one. This indicates that the author is of the opinion that 
there does not exist a ‘real world’ which is independent of our knowledge of it. The 
epistemological position adopted in this thesis is the one of ‘constructionism.’59 The 
term ‘constructionism’ generally refers to the belief that all knowledge, or meaningful 
reality, is constructed through the interaction between human beings and their world. 
As such, meaning in objects is never discovered but it only comes into being when 
consciousness interacts with it.60
56 Held, “Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty,” 23. Held, Global Covenant: The 
Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus, 143.
57Textbooks on qualitative and quantitative research use different terminology. Whereas some differentiate 
between the expressions ‘methodology’ and ‘method’, others do not. In this thesis, the author makes use 
only of the term ‘methodology’ when referring to this issue. The expression ‘ontology’ addresses the ques-
tion of whether “there is a ‘real’ world ‘out there’ that is independent of our knowledge of it.” If one answers 
this question in the affirmative that person takes a foundationalist ontological position. Equally so, if a per-
son does not believe that there is a ‘real’ world, their ontological position can be labelled anti-
foundationalist. David Marsh and Paul Furlong, “A Skin not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Po-
litical Science,” in Theory and Methods in Political Science, eds. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, 17-41 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 18. The term ‘epistemology’ is here defined as “the theory of 
knowledge embedded in the theoretical perspective and thereby in the methodology.” Michael Crotty, The 
Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process (London: SAGE Pub-
lications, 1998), 3. The term ‘theoretical perspective’ can be understood as “the philosophical stance in-
forming the methodology and thus providing a context for the process and grounding its logic and criteria.” 
Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process, 3.
58 Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process, 2.
59 As Crotty explains, the term ‘constructionism’ generally refers to the belief that “all knowledge, and 
therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out 
of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially 
social context.” Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research 
Process, 42.
60 See Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process, 
42-43.
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Michael Crotty explains that the epistemology of constructionism is the foundation of 
most theoretical perspectives, mainly excluding positivist and post-positivist para-
digms.61 Consequently, critical theory, the theoretical perspective embraced in this dis-
sertation, is also a form of constructionism. Critical theory has its origin in the era of the 
Enlightenment. Kant, Hegel and Marx are the first scholars brought into a relationship 
with this philosophy.62 In the twentieth century, critical theory became most closely tied
to the so-called Frankfurt School, which had its roots in the Institute for Social Re-
search set up in 1924 by Felix Weil.63 In particular, the works of Max Horkheimer, 
Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Leo Lowenthal 
and, more recently, of Jürgen Habermas were responsible for the further development 
of this perspective.64 Today, critical theory is best defined as “the emblem of a philoso-
phy which questions the prevailing order of social and political modernity through a 
method of immanent critique.”65 In more detail, this means that critical theory under-
takes research that challenges; its research does not accept the status quo but it aims 
to bring about change. Also, as the quotation indicates, this perspective criticises the 
social order with its institutions and structures. Most importantly, it focuses on power 
relationships within society with the purpose of depicting the forces of hegemony and 
injustice. Commenting on the objectives of critical theory, Crotty elucidates: “The goals 
of critical inquiry [critical theory] – the just society, freedom, equity – may appear uto-
pian. Nevertheless, while critical inquirers admit the impossibility of effecting consum-
mate social justice, they believe their struggle to be worthwhile. It can lead at least to a 
more just and freer society than we have at the moment.”66
This perspective is often criticised by positivists for its normative approach to the sub-
ject in question. Proponents of positivism argue that critical theory is value- and ethics-
laden and that it is, thus, emotive. As Steve Buckler points out referring to the beliefs of 
61 See Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process, 4. 
Contrary to constructionism, proponents of positivism believe that “objects in the world have meaning prior 
to, and independently of, any consciousness of them.” Consequently, the only scientific knowledge is ob-
jective knowledge. Positivists believe that truth or facts can only be gathered through observation, experi-
ence and comparison. Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Re-
search Process, 27.
62 See Richard Devetak, “Critical Theory,” in Theories of International Relations, by Scott Burchill and 
Andrew Linklater, 145-178 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 145-146.
63 See Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process, 
125.
64 See Devetak, “Critical Theory,” 146.
65 Devetak, “Critical Theory,” 146.
66 Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process, 157.
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positivist David Hume: “Since all true knowledge comes from empirical experience, 
statements of value could not be said to be in any sense expressions of knowledge and 
were only matters of convention.”67 Similarly, the positivists A. J. Ayer and T.D. Weldon 
perceive value-statements as non-objective and, thus, as inappropriate for rational in-
quiry or argument.68 However, while these criticisms are acknowledged, it must be kept 
in mind that critical theory is a mainstream theoretical perspective embraced by a great 
number of scholars.69 Crotty goes so far as to maintain that the epistemology of con-
structionism, on which critical theory is based, has replaced positivism as the dominant 
paradigm in some areas.70 In terms of critical theory itself, it has been argued that in
contrast to positivism it is a theory which is strongly linked to practice when aiming at 
justice, freedom and equity in society. It can, therefore, be labelled a genuine force. 
Positivism, on the other hand, lacks both: the link to practice and being a genuine 
force.71 Critical theorists define positivism as a “science that reduces valid knowledge 
to what can be verified statistically, thus robbing experience of its vitality.”72
It is believed that the theoretical perspective of critical theory is the best perspective to 
address the topic in question. This thesis assesses the feasibility for implementing an 
RBA to NEPAD. The research conducted and the results obtained are closely linked to 
the interpretations of human rights and development scholars as well as to the analy-
ses of the author. As such, the work is value- and ethics-laden and, therefore, norma-
tive – a key characteristic of the critical theory approach. Moreover, this project, in line 
with the objectives of critical theory, challenges the status quo and it seeks to bring 
about change. Most significantly, this thesis challenges the World Bank’s current em-
ployment of human rights-devoid SAPs in developing countries and, in particular, in 
Africa. It seeks to cause change by recommending the implementation of an RBA to 
NEPAD. Also, as in the critical theory approach, the dissertation focuses on power rela-
tionships within society, criticising the current social order with its institutions and struc-
tures. Again, reference can be made to the World Bank’s SAPs in African countries, 
which demonstrate a highly uneven power relationship between the two. The current 
67 Steve Buckler, “Normative Theory,” in Theory and Methods in Political Science, eds. David Marsh and 
Gerry Stoker, 172-194 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 173.
68 See Buckler, “Normative Theory,” 175.
69 See Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process, 
114.
70 See Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process, 
42.
71 See Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process, 
130.
72 Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process, 131.
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social order is criticised, focussing particularly on the financial institution of the World 
Bank and on the structures in which it is embedded.
It follows from the choice of the theoretical perspective of critical theory that the meth-
odology adopted is qualitative in character. The goal is not to collect sets of quantitative 
data and to then formulate statistical verifications that are disconnected from reality –
the typical positivist approach. On the contrary, the research conducted should lead to 
valid knowledge, it should be linked to practice and, finally, it should be a genuine 
force. As a result, the research conducted is qualitative in character. It involves the 
methodologies of case study, document analysis and interviews. All three fulfil the 
characteristics of valid knowledge, practice and genuine force. NEPAD is the case 
study of this thesis. In terms of document analysis, different types of primary sources 
are investigated to collect the necessary data. Among the primary sources reviewed 
are, first and foremost, NEPAD documents whose contents lay the foundation for the 
proposed work. To receive a range of perspectives on the topic, the examination of 
these policy papers is supplemented by an investigation of reports and statements by 
the United Nations (e.g. UNDP, Office of the UNHCHR, the Independent Expert on the 
Right to Development etc.); NGOs (e.g. AI, HRW, Oxfam etc.); IGOs (e.g. the World 
Bank etc.); and governments that have worked on the issue of the RBA to development 
(e.g. Canada etc.). In addition to analysing primary documents, reports and statements, 
an interview is conducted with a professional in the fields of human rights and devel-
opment.73 This semi-structured, open-ended interview is undertaken by email. Apart 
from accompanying the analysis of the above-mentioned primary sources, the interview
may supply additional and unique insights into the issue studied. For example, inter-
views provide the possibility of asking professionals in the field the research question 
directly, thereby receiving answers that might differ from the written material examined. 
Moreover, professionals’ often first-hand experience can add a practical perspective to 
the matter explored.
The examination of the primary sources listed is finally complemented by an investiga-
tion of secondary sources, such as books and articles. These are mainly written by 
experts in the field, including academics, lawyers, journalists, development practitio-
ners and human rights activists. The intention is that the research conducted is ap-
73 Out of eight professionals contacted, only one responded to my interview request. Magnus Killander was 
interviewed by email on May 8, 2006.
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proached from all perspectives, thus attempting to minimise the inevitable problems 
associated with a selective and incomplete interpretation of the subject. 
1.5 Scope and Limits
The introduction is followed by four additional chapters. Chapter 2 contains two sec-
tions, which review the most important literature on the two main issues laying the 
foundation of this thesis. The first segment deals with the RBA to development, pre-
sents its evolution, outlines its main components and establishes the authors’ different 
perspectives regarding this approach. The second part introduces NEPAD by providing 
a general overview of the initial policy document. Moreover, this section highlights the 
general criticisms in regard to NEPAD and, specifically, its lack of an RBA.
The third chapter identifies the World Bank’s SAPs as the principal economic obstacle
to implementing the RBA to NEPAD. This thesis is limited to exploring this impediment
only, because the Bank’s SAPs are the main economic hindrance investigated in the 
literature. Therefore, the necessary resources are provided for undertaking this disser-
tation. Also, to include the identification of further obstacles such as political and cul-
tural or even technical impediments would exceed the scope of a Masters thesis. Fi-
nally, concentrating on this economic hindrance is advantageous for the application of 
the theoretical framework of the regime of liberal international sovereignty. 
Chapter 4 will assess the feasibility of implementing an RBA to NEPAD on two sepa-
rate levels. Whereas the first assessment focuses on the actions required by the World 
Bank, the second evaluation applies Held’s theoretical framework to the findings of 
chapter 3. In doing so, both assessments contribute to investigating and commenting 
on the likelihood of applying an RBA to NEPAD. 
The final chapter consists of a summary of the research undertaken by highlighting the 
findings of the previous chapters. Also, the utilisation of the methodology and the theo-
retical framework employed is critiqued. Moreover, the conclusion serves as the place 
to present an overview of possible future research projects, which have emerged from 
the thesis. Finally, it offers an outlook on what is likely to happen in this field of study in 
the near future.
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Chapter 2
2. Literature Review
The literature reviewed focuses on two main aspects: the RBA to development and the 
African development programme, NEPAD. Where there exist weaknesses in the litera-
ture or gaps or disagreement, this is made apparent and explained. However, it needs
to be kept in mind that both topics are fairly new on the international human rights and 
development agenda and, thus, are still partially unexplored. Consequently, this means 
that many long-lasting problems, debates or controversies have not yet had the time to 
fully develop and strengthen and so disadvantages and disagreements are even now 
rather low in number.
2.1 Evolution of the RBA to Development
The RBA to development is the result of an increasing convergence of the two disci-
plines of human rights and development over the last decades. As Amparo Tomás 
points out, the objectives of development, peace and human rights all arrive on the 
scene with the coming into force of the United Nations Charter in October 1945. The 
creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 also includes develop-
ment and human rights as interrelated objectives, the document consisting of CP rights 
as well as ESC rights.74 However, the emergence of the Cold War and the ideological 
division that followed brought an end to a further convergence until the beginning of its 
dissolution in the late 1980s. In fact, this period was characterised by the North and the 
South having numerous discussions on the relationship between both disciplines.75
Also, in 1966 two separate covenants appeared, splitting the issue of human rights into 
the ICCPR and the ICESCR.
With the acceptance of the Declaration on the Right to Development by the General 
Assembly in 1986, the objectives of human rights and development were once again 
on the same agenda and an increasing convergence of both can be observed from 
then onwards.76 Yet, one should note, as Brigitte Hamm states, that as well as the 146 
‘yes’ votes in the General Assembly, there were eight abstentions of primarily industri-
alised Western countries and one negative vote of the United States, thus indicating 
74 See Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 6.
75 See Brigitte I. Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001): 
1008. Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 6.
76 See Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 6.
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that debate still existed on this matter.77 The UN World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna in 1993 can be seen as a further step towards convergence. Sengupta speaks 
of a new consensus emerging at that time with even the United States supporting the 
matter.78 Indeed, the Vienna Declaration reaffirmed “the right to development, as estab-
lished in the Declaration, as a universal and inalienable right and an integral part of 
fundamental human rights.”79 Despite ongoing debates between the North and the 
South on issues such as international aid, debt and trade relations, since 1993 there 
have been numerous positive moves towards the integration of human rights into the
development process and towards an RBA: in 1995, the World Summit for Social De-
velopment; in 1998, the UNDP Policy on Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable 
Human Development; in 2000, the United Nations Millennium Declaration and the 2000
UNDP Human Development Report Human Rights and Human Development.80
In accordance with the statements made above, Tomás, William O’Neill and Mahesh 
Patel all point out that the RBA to development is not an entirely new approach but that 
it incorporates the strengths of traditional programming and, therefore, builds on previ-
ous development approaches.81 As Patel puts it: the RBA “does not require the re-
placement of traditional planning activities with something completely different. Rather 
it serves as a means of adding value to those activities through changes in the ways in 
which they are implemented and the issues they cover.”82
2.2 The Main Components of the RBA to Development
The webpage of the UNHCHR affirms that there does not exist a particular, universally 
agreed upon RBA to development, although an agreement on the basic constituent 
elements may be emerging.83 It can be argued that this constitutes one of the major 
77 See Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” 1009.
78 See Allan Rosas, “The Right to Development,” in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, 
edited by Asbjorn Eide et al., 119-130. 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), 125. Sen-
gupta, “On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development,” 841.
79 UN General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference 
on Human Rights (Vienna, 25 June 1993), A/CONF.157/23. part 1, para. 10.
80 See Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” 1008. Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to 
Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 6.
81 William G. O’Neill, An Introduction to the Concept of Rights-Based Approach to Development: A Paper 
for InterAction (Washington D.C.: InterAction, December 2003), 1. Mahesh Patel, “Human Rights as an 
Emerging Development Paradigm and Some Implications for Programme Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation,” First draft (United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], 2001), 40. Tomás, A Human Rights 
Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 1.
82 Patel, “Human Rights as an Emerging Development Paradigm and Some Implications for Programme 
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation,” 40.
83 See UNHCHR, “Rights-Based Approaches,” http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html (accessed 
February 1, 2005).
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weaknesses of the literature studied since it is rather difficult to pinpoint the main com-
ponents of the RBA. In terms of the human rights principles, while issues such as par-
ticipation, accountability and non-discrimination are listed by all authors as highly im-
portant attributes of the RBA, others such as empowerment, equity and equality are 
named more irregularly. Therefore, in an attempt to present accurate results, the fol-
lowing selection mirrors a summary of the key choices made by the leading profes-
sionals in the field. In general, the elements that constitute the conceptual framework of 
the RBA are international human rights standards and principles. In addition, several 
aspects are mentioned as being important issues regarding the RBA, for example: the 
move away from charity towards obligation; the process of development being a human 
right; and the issue of dignity.
Before further engaging in this exercise, it is of significance to recall the general idea of 
the RBA to development as explained in the introduction. Manfred Nowak in his essay, 
“A Human Rights Approach to Poverty”, gives one of the most recent definitions on this 
subject. He elucidates that the RBA is based “on the explicit recognition of a legally 
binding normative framework with rights, entitlements, duties, responsibilities and ac-
countability.”84 Consequently, as Tomás indicates, the RBA to development utilises the 
international human rights framework with its standards and principles to analyse de-
velopment processes and to design and implement appropriate strategies.85 While the 
above illustrates the theoretical implications of the RBA, it is also important to note its 
practical dimensions. André Frankovits explains this issue well. He states: “The ap-
proach is a tool box available to rights claimants, human rights advocates and devel-
opment actors that provides the means to better analyse poverty, to hold duty-bearers 
accountable for development and to empower people to claim their rights.”86
84 Manfred Nowak, “A Human Rights Approach to Poverty,” In Human Rights in Development Yearbook 
2002. Empowerment, Participation, Accountability and Non-Discrimination: Operationalising a Human 
Rights-Based Approach to Development, eds. Martin Scheinin and Markku Suksi, 15-35 (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 27.
85 See Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 11.
86 André Frankovits, “Introduction,” In Human Rights in Development Yearbook 2002. Empowerment, Par-
ticipation, Accountability and Non-Discrimination: Operationalising a Human Rights-Based Approach to 
Development, eds. Martin Scheinin and Markku Suksi, 1-14 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 5.
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2.2.1 International Human Rights Standards 
International human rights standards are usually found in international treaties and dec-
larations but can also be contained in documents such as ‘guidelines’ or ‘principles.’87
Every right mentioned in a treaty or declaration covers a number of standards, which 
represent this right in all its diversity. The ‘right to life,’ for example, includes such stan-
dards as extrajudicial executions, genocide and killing by civilians in armed conflict.88
As a basis of the RBA, these international human rights standards “help to define the 
type of results pursued in the development process.”89 Therefore, the standards are “an 
objective ‘roadmap’ to human development goals that prevent ‘capture’ of the devel-
opment agenda, and set minimum guarantees for poor and disadvantaged groups.”90
2.2.2 International Human Rights Principles
Whereas the international human rights standards are directly linked to the results pur-
sued in development programming, international human rights principles form the 
process of development, which in the RBA is seen as being as important as the out-
come of development.91 Different authors refer to different principles, however, some 
principles reoccur continually. Among these are the following, to be further explained in 
the subsequent paragraphs: participation; accountability; non-discrimination; empow-
erment; and equity.
All authors writing about the RBA agree on the importance of the principle of participa-
tion as a most valuable aspect of the RBA to development.92 The idea of the principle 
of participation is for claim-holders to participate in the assessment, decision-making 
and implementation of development strategies in an active, free and meaningful man-
ner.93 However, despite the unambiguous definition of this principle, a number of 
scholars including Hamm, Sengupta and Tomás, point out that too often participation 
87 See Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 18.  
UNHCHR, “Rights-Based Approaches,” http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html (accessed February 
1, 2005).
88 See Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 18.  
89 Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 11.  
90 Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 14.  
91 See Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 11-12. 
Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 137.
92 See André Frankovits, “Rules to Live by: The Human Rights Approach to Development,” The Fletcher 
Journal of Development Studies XVII (2002): 14. Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” 
1018-1019. Sano, “Development and Human Rights: The Necessary, but Partial Integration of Human 
Rights and Development,” 751. UN Economic and Social Council, Arjun Sengupta, Fourth Report of the 
Independent Expert on the Right to Development (Geneva, 20 December 2001), E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/2, 
11. UNHCHR, “Rights-Based Approaches,” http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html (accessed Feb-
ruary 1, 2005). Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 138.
93 See Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 12.
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has been understood by duty-bearers as mere consultation or acceptance of already 
finalised development projects.94 As Hamm notes: “Donors, development organiza-
tions, IFIs, and sometimes also NGOs have a rather formal understanding of participa-
tion, which means informing the people concerned of more or less fully planned and 
designed projects.”95 Yet, the RBA asks for a form of participation which includes con-
trol over the planning, the process, the outcome and the evaluation of development.96
To understand this principle as anything less, Sengupta states, “would frustrate the 
intent of the human rights approach to participation.”97
Another significant aspect inherent in the RBA to development is the principle of ac-
countability, again mentioned by a variety of sources.98 For each human right there 
exists a corresponding duty. Thus generally, accountability means that there are claim-
holders who have specific entitlements and, at the same time, duty-bearers who have 
specific obligations.99 To increase mechanisms of accountability by, for example, de-
veloping adequate laws, policies, institutions, administrative procedures and practices
to better monitor progress is the goal of this principle within the RBA.100 In addition,
Uvin stresses: “An RBA will focus more on social structures, loci of power, rule of law, 
empowerment, and structural change in favor of the poorest and most deprived, as well 
as mechanisms for reprieve in case of violation. It will work on information and re-
dress.”101 As such, in the context of development assistance, the principle of account-
ability characterises a move away from charity towards obligation. This obligation ap-
plies equally to recipient governments and to international donors. However, Frankovits 
reveals that the legal status of the principle of accountability is still being developed 
94 See Frankovits 2005, “Introduction,” 12. Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” 1018-
1019. Sengupta, Fourth Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Development, 11. Tomás, A 
Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 12.
95 Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” 1018-1019.
96 See Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” 1019.
97 Sengupta, Fourth Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Development, 11.
98 See Frankovits, “Rules to Live by: The Human Rights Approach to Development,” 15. Sano, “Develop-
ment and Human Rights: The Necessary, but Partial Integration of Human Rights and Development,” 752. 
Sengupta, Fourth Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Development, 11. Tomás, A Human 
Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 13. UNHCHR, “Rights-Based 
Approaches,” http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html (accessed February 1, 2005). Uvin, Human 
Rights and Development, 131.
99 See Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 13. 
UNHCHR, “Rights-Based Approaches,” http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html (accessed February 
1, 2005).
100 See UNHCHR, “Rights-Based Approaches,” http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html (accessed 
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and is therefore in its formative stages. There do not yet exist any penalising measures 
for those donors denying this responsibility.102
A third issue that the RBA to development adheres to is the principle of non-
discrimination. The design and implementation of all development policies and prac-
tices has to be pursued without any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, sex, 
language, political or other opinion, religion, national or social origin, poverty, birth or 
other status.103 As a consequence, the principle of non-discrimination focuses particu-
larly on disadvantaged groups and individuals in society, that is, those who are more 
discriminated against. This includes women, the elderly and people living with the hu-
man immune deficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS).104
Empowerment can be defined as the process by which the ability of people to claim 
and utilise their rights effectively grows.105 Therefore, people are empowered once it is 
in their own control and hence it becomes their right, due to attained capacities and 
capabilities, to positively influence their own communities, lives and destinies.106 For 
example, the ability to participate in the development process in an active, free and 
meaningful manner would lead to a growing capacity to claim and exercise rights, 
thereby contributing to the empowerment of people. In that sense, the principle of par-
ticipation is linked to the principle of empowerment.107
Finally, the aspect of equity has also been frequently named as a principle that the 
RBA to development must adhere to. The RBA has been defined in the Declaration on 
the Right to Development and other following international resolutions as a process 
that is participatory, non-discriminatory, accountable and transparent, with equity in 
decision-making and sharing of the outcomes of the process. Commenting on the par-
ticular issue of equity, Sengupta notes: “Equity – which is essential to any notion of 
human rights derived from the idea of equality of all human beings in rights, dignity and 
102 See Frankovits, “Rules to Live by: The Human Rights Approach to Development,” 15.
103 See Sengupta, Fourth Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Development, 10.
104 See Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” 1018. Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to 
Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 13.
105 See Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 14.
106 See UNHCHR, “Rights-Based Approaches,” http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html (accessed 
February 1, 2005).
107 See Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitioners, 14.
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opportunity, and is associated with fairness or the principles of a just society – is basic 
to that process.”108
2.2.3 The Move Away From Charity Towards Obligation
Not only does the RBA to development incorporate international human rights stan-
dards and principles, there also exist a number of issues mentioned repeatedly by the
authors writing on the RBA, which deserve further attention. One such aspect is that, in 
the context of development assistance, the principle of accountability and therefore the 
RBA characterises a move away from charity towards obligation.109 This means, for 
example, that whereas in traditional development programmes necessities like food, 
education and health were perceived as matters of charity, they are now seen as a 
person’s right.110 This is so because the RBA stems from the assumption that duty-
bearers such as recipient governments, donor governments and international organisa-
tions have the responsibility, under international law, to respect, protect and fulfil hu-
man rights. This obligation is set out, for instance, in the UN Charter as well as in inter-
national human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR and the ICESCR.111 However, both 
Frankovits and Hamm point out that the enforcement of these duties is rather weak in 
international law, no penalising measures existing for those donors denying this re-
sponsibility.112 Nevertheless, Frankovits argues that international donors dedicated to 
the realisation of human rights as established under international law “should be com-
fortable with accepting this accountability.”113
2.2.4 The Process of Development as a Human Right
A number of authors repeatedly mention the important fact that in terms of the RBA to 
development, it is not only the outcome of development which is a human right; also, it 
is the process of development, of how to get to the outcome, which represents a hu-
man right. Therefore, human rights must be protected, respected and fulfilled through-
108 Sengupta, “On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development,” 846.
109 See Frankovits, “Rules to Live by: The Human Rights Approach to Development,” 14-15. Hamm, “A 
Human Rights Approach to Development,” 1014. Sano, “Development and Human Rights: The Necessary, 
but Partial Integration of Human Rights and Development,” 745. Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 
131.
110 See Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” 1014.
111 See Frankovits, “Rules to Live by: The Human Rights Approach to Development,” 14. Hamm, “A Hu-
man Rights Approach to Development,” 1014.
112 See Frankovits, “Rules to Live by: The Human Rights Approach to Development,” 15. Hamm, “A Hu-
man Rights Approach to Development,” 1016.
113 Frankovits, “Rules to Live by: The Human Rights Approach to Development,” 15.
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out the entire work towards the development aims.114 However, this has not always 
been the case. As the UNDP Human Development Report 2000 states in regard to 
past human development practice: 
Development thinking has traditionally focused on the outcomes of vari-
ous kinds of social arrangements. And although human development 
thinking has always insisted on the importance of the process of devel-
opment, many of the tools developed by the human development ap-
proach measure the outcomes of social arrangements in a way that is 
not sensitive to how these outcomes were brought about.115
As revealed above, today a different belief exists among many human rights and de-
velopment professionals. Some think that the process might indeed be even more im-
portant than the outcome of development work. Uvin gives a number of examples for 
sharing this opinion. First, he argues that the amount of money spent on development 
assistance globally is not nearly enough to reach contented outcomes for the world’s 
poor; only a few will profit from the small amount of financial aid distributed. Conse-
quently, Uvin claims, people affected by development may very well feel more of an 
influence if, through the process of development, institutions become established, 
strengthened, weakened or destroyed. Moreover, he maintains, development assis-
tance has often led to negative consequences, such as corruption, inequality and so-
cial exclusion, sometimes outweighing the achievements in terms of technical goals.116
As a result, Uvin concludes: “Good processes are considerably more important for 
long-term development than good products.”117
2.2.5 The Issue of Dignity
A final aspect deserving further attention is the issue of dignity referred to in connection 
with the RBA to development. Obviously, there must be some sort of relationship be-
tween the RBA and the aspect of dignity since human rights have as one of their objec-
tives to provide all people with a dignified life. Yet, it seems important to point this out in 
more detail to once again demonstrate the difference between traditional approaches 
and the RBA to development. Whereas past economic development approaches did 
114 See UN Economic and Social Council, Arjun Sengupta, Study on the Current State of Progress in the 
Implementation of the Right to Development (Geneva, 27 July 1999), E/CN.4/1999/WG.18/2, paras. 36-56. 
UNDP, Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and Human Development, 22. Uvin, Human 
Rights and Development, 137.
115 UNDP, Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and Human Development, 22.
116 See Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 137-138.
117 Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 138.
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not concern themselves with dignity, the RBA has dignity at its core.118 Not only does 
the approach assume that people have dignity, but also one of the bottom-line notions 
of the RBA is that it focuses on supporting people to lead a dignified life.119
2.3 Why Have an RBA to Development?
One of the core assumptions of this thesis is that only the RBA to development, with its 
high moral standards but also its adherence to international human rights standards 
and principles, offers Africa the chance to pursue sustainable human, social and eco-
nomic development within the NEPAD framework. Yet, the debate on this subject 
would not be complete if the critical voices of this approach are left out. Consequently, 
before further engaging in a discussion on the advantages of an RBA to development, 
the subsequent paragraphs will highlight possible problems or disadvantages related to 
this approach, followed by answers by the proponents of the RBA.
2.3.1 Critical Voices Have Their Say
In fact, it is the human rights and development scholars themselves who point out that 
the RBA to development is not the answer to all the injustices and difficulties apparent 
in development work.120 Similarly, Hamm declares, that a rights-based approach does 
not automatically promise more success in the development field.121 Finally, as Uvin so 
vividly states: “The RBA is not the solution to all problems, a magical key that will finally 
unlock the gates of development nirvana.”122 But what the RBA does provide, Uvin af-
firms, “is a lens, a way of looking at the world, of defining struggles and partaking in 
them.”123 For example, Hamm maintains that one significant change the RBA brings 
with it is its focus on accountability, a new lens through which charity now becomes a 
legal obligation to be fulfilled by the various duty-holders.124 Referring to the issue of 
dignity, Sano, on a different note, explains that human rights have the ability to estab-
118 See Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 138.
119 See Susan H. Holcombe and Raymond C. Offenheiser, “Challenges and Opportunities in Implementing 
a Rights-Based Approach to Development: An Oxfam America Perspective,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sec-
tor Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2003): 271. Sano, “Development and Human Rights: The Necessary, but Partial 
Integration of Human Rights and Development,” 751.
120 See Sano, “Development and Human Rights: The Necessary, but Partial Integration of Human Rights 
and Development,” 751.
121 See Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” 1012.
122 Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 166.
123 Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 166.
124 See Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” 1012.
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lish an area of security and dignity around the human person from which, then, devel-
opment can set out.125
Apart from these statements of the RBA not being a panacea, another matter still 
widely debated relates to the nature of second generation rights, including ESC rights. 
It is argued, especially by some governments, that the nature of these rights differs 
fundamentally from that of first generation rights, the so-called CP rights. From this 
follows the argument that the implementation of ESC rights is more difficult than that of 
CP rights.126 In more detail, CP rights have often been defined as ‘negative’ rights, 
whereas ESC rights are generally known as ‘positive’ rights. While negative rights ‘only’ 
ask the government to abstain from behaving in a certain way (i.e. torture, extra-legal 
executions etc.), positive rights expect the government to become actively engaged to 
respect, protect and fulfil a right. Consequently, the latter is seen as more cost inten-
sive for governments and the implementation of these rights as more complicated.127
However, Uvin points out that the human rights community has come up with two re-
sponses to this partial disregard of ESC rights. To begin with, he states that the goals 
posed by ESC rights are not as unrealistic and unrealisable as they may appear to be. 
This is so because the ESC treaties do take into consideration the problems of re-
source constraints and, thereby, formulate the duties to be as reasonable as possi-
ble.128 The article probably cited most in connection with the above is Article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR. It states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, in-
dividually and through international assistance and co-operation, espe-
cially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available re-
sources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, in-
cluding particularly the adoption of legislative means129 (emphasis 
added).
125 See Sano, “Development and Human Rights: The Necessary, but Partial Integration of Human Rights 
and Development,” 751.
126 See Frankovits, “Rules to Live by: The Human Rights Approach to Development,” 11. Uvin, Human 
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127 See Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 38-39.
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129 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 1966, entered into force in 1976, Art. 2(1).
27
Because of the rather vague character of these terms, efforts have been undertaken 
since then to define them in a more stringent way. For example, the term ‘to the maxi-
mum of its available resources’ has been redefined in the so-called Limburg Princi-
ples130 as well as by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Referring 
to this term, the latter explained in its General Comment 3 of 1990 that:
the Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure 
the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of 
the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a 
State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of 
essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter 
and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, fail-
ing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant 
were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core 
obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d’être.131
As a result, Uvin argues that these treaties and their subsequent interpretations do 
contain language, which makes the duties outlined therein realistic and hence realis-
able. Therefore, they constitute a reasonable response to the marginalisation of ESC
rights.132 A second answer to the partial disregard of ESC rights, he explains, is to 
classify the nature of state obligations without the distinction between negative and 
positive rights. A new argument put forward by scholars, then, claims that all human 
rights, CP rights as well as ESC rights, entail the three-fold obligation to respect, to 
protect and to fulfil. So, both sets of rights are analysed in the same way by applying 
these three categories. Consequently, CP and ESC rights are not perceived as differ-
ent in this new approach, thereby abolishing the marginalisation of the latter.133
130 See Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, E/CN.4/1987/17, Appendix 1. In regard to the term ‘to the maximum of its available re-
sources’, the Limburg Principles state the following in paragraphs 25 to 28: 
25. States parties are obligated, regardless of the level of economic development, to ensure re-
spect for minimum subsistence rights for all.
26. "Its available resources" refers to both the resources within a State and those available from 
the international community through international co-operation and assistance.
27. In determining whether adequate measures have been taken for the realization of the rights 
recognized in the Covenant attention shall be paid to equitable and effective use of and access to 
the available resources.
28. In the use of the available resources due priority shall be given to the realization of rights rec-
ognized in the Covenant, mindful of the need to assure to everyone the satisfaction of subsis-
tence requirements as well as the provision of essential services.
131 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Nature of States Parties Obligations, 
General Comment 3, 1990.
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Finally, a third problem that can be identified relates to the issue of intervention. Again, 
it is an acknowledged human rights and development scholar, namely Uvin, who him-
self asks the question of whether this newly emerging development mandate, with its 
extension to human rights via the RBA, constitutes an agenda too interventionist. In-
deed, he worries that such is the case. Nevertheless, he does not believe that the re-
sponse to this problem lies in the return to past development practice or in the ceasing 
of all development aid.134 Instead, Uvin argues that “the development community must 
find ways to counter the necessary expansion of its mandate with an equally necessary 
reduction in its power, its capacity for conceptualization and initiative, its control over 
finances, and its lack of accountability.”135 While he agrees that this goal is very difficult 
to achieve, he nonetheless provides the reader with three ideas, which can possibly 
reduce unchecked interventionism and the facades of moral high ground. In brief, they 
are the following: first, he encourages the use of the radical capacity building approach, 
which requires that the power of initiative and conceptualisation is transferred to local 
people, thus diminishing external influence and control. Second, he mentions the fur-
ther establishment of social movements that utilise human rights as a means to restruc-
ture the international political economy so that it becomes human rights-based. As a 
consequence, it serves the development of not only the rich countries and their popula-
tions but also the poor ones. Lastly, Uvin supports the notion that the development en-
terprise should do far less and instead concentrate more on the adherence to the RBA
to development. He argues that development assistance at present is only halfway 
undertaken and, therefore, failing too often to be truly successful.136
2.3.2 Advantages of the RBA to Development
Having identified and assessed the problems an RBA to development might entail, 
what, then, are the advantages of the RBA? Why should governments, IGOs, NGOs
and individuals who work in the development field adopt an RBA instead of the tradi-
tional development policies? 
A number of scholars have come up with various reasons for employing this approach
in development. A few of them were already mentioned as a response to disadvan-
tages in the first paragraph of the last section. However, the best overview of argu-
134 See Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 195-197.
135 Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 197.
136 See Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 197-199.
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ments is provided by the webpage of the UNHCHR. Former High Commissioner, Mary 
Robinson, in her opening statement to the General Assembly Special Session on So-
cial Development held in Geneva in June 2000, highlighted the following: “rights-based 
approaches bring the promise of more effective, more sustainable, more rational and 
more genuine development processes.”137 The webpage explains in more detail why 
exactly they do so, often referring to the positive influence of the international human 
rights principles. First, and already mentioned by Hamm in the preceding section, the 
RBA offers enhanced accountability due to the identification of duties and duty-bearers, 
thereby turning the issue of charity in development into one of obligation.138 Secondly, 
an RBA gives the local population the power to participate in an active, free and mean-
ingful manner, thus also increasing the levels of empowerment and ownership in de-
velopment. All three are regarded as important assets in the pursuit of a country’s sus-
tainable development.139 Moreover, due to the RBA’s foundation in the standards and 
principles of the international human rights framework, the RBA provides normative 
clarity and detail for everyone dealing with this matter, listing definitions on the content 
of development and on all the rights. This, it is further argued, leads to an easier con-
sensus in regard to national development processes because development plans and 
policies can be based on the instruments of the human rights framework instead of on, 
for instance, imported foreign development models. Fifthly, the RBA to development, in 
its ideal form, focuses not just on selected issues as former economic development 
approaches have often done; instead, it takes into consideration all areas of human 
development, including education, health, housing, personal security and political par-
ticipation. This, then, will lead to a more complete and rational development framework.
Another very important argument is the fact that an RBA contains integrated safe-
guards against the harm caused by development projects. Many times, development 
projects have not adhered to international human rights standards and thus violated 
those people’s rights. This possibility is diminished with the employment of the RBA.140
Lastly, the RBA to development offers a more complete and therefore more effective 
analysis of poverty. This is so because earlier analyses of poverty were mainly eco-
137 UNHCHR, “Rights-Based Approaches,” http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html (accessed Febru-
ary 1, 2005).
138 See Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” 1012. UNHCHR, “Rights-Based Ap-
proaches,” http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html (accessed February 1, 2005).
139 See UNHCHR, “Rights-Based Approaches,” http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html (accessed 
February 1, 2005). Tomás, A Human Rights Approach to Development: Primer for Development Practitio-
ners, 14.
140 See UNHCHR, “Rights-Based Approaches,” http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html (accessed 
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nomic in character, often based only on income and other economic indicators. The 
RBA, instead, raises important issues that concern the poor themselves, such as the 
problems of powerlessness and social exclusion. In turn, such an improved analysis 
will result in better responses and outcomes.141 In addition to the reasons stated above, 
Sengupta explains that the RBA is of benefit due to its increased focus on “those who 
lag behind others in enjoying their rights.”142 He adds that consequently, the RBA en-
tails that positive action is taken on their behalf.143 The great number of benefits the 
RBA seems to offer leads Frankovits to conclude the following: “From an ethical, moral, 
and efficiency perspective it is only the human rights approach to development that can 
prove at once effective and sustainable.”144 With this comment, he points out the sig-
nificant fact that the RBA is not only about efficiency. Equally important, it has as its 
advantage the absolute recognition of moral high ground.
While the above gives the reader a good idea of the theoretical benefits of the RBA to 
development, one could argue that this does not say anything about whether, and if so, 
how the RBA is exercised in practice. In fact, a few scholars highlight the lack of docu-
mentation on the practical implementation of the RBA to development programmes.145
However, occasional successful applications of the RBA to a specific development 
programme have already been observed. To provide the reader with such a practical 
insight and thus a complete picture of the advantages of the RBA, the subsequent 
paragraphs will focus on a case study detailing the application of the RBA to high ma-
ternal mortality in Peru. This case study is part of a report published by the United Na-
tions Children’s Fund (UNICEF),146 which supports the adoption of an RBA to devel-
opment in Peru with its UNICEF Cooperation Programme.
A major issue in the country of Peru is the high maternal mortality rate. In average, 185 
maternal deaths are registered for 100,000 live births. However, this number more than 
triples in the remote Andean highland areas. For many years, agencies thought of this 
141 See UNHCHR, “Rights-Based Approaches,” http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html (accessed 
February 1, 2005). Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 130.
142 Sengupta, Study on the Current State of Progress in the Implementation of the Right to Development, 
8.
143 See Sengupta, Study on the Current State of Progress in the Implementation of the Right to Develop-
ment, 8.
144 Frankovits, “Rules to Live by: The Human Rights Approach to Development,” 16-17.
145 See Frankovits, “Rules to Live by: The Human Rights Approach to Development,” 11. Hamm, “A Hu-
man Rights Approach to Development,” 1022.
146 See United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), A Review of a UNICEF Country Programme Based on 
Human Rights: The Case of Peru (UNICEF, 2002).
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problem as a pure healthcare issue and therefore saw the solution as increasing the 
money spent on hospitals. Moreover, they found it efficient to educate the Andean
women on the advantages of modern medicine. Despite the actions taken, hardly any 
improvements were recorded. Consequently, traditional development efforts have basi-
cally failed to diminish the high maternal mortality rate.147
As a result, UNICEF and its local partners adopted an RBA to this development issue.
The approach consisted of several aspects, including the sectors of health, education, 
indigenous cultural rights and the status of women generally, as well as disparities and 
exclusion. UNICEF and partners became involved in consultations with Andean women 
and local health workers and then carried out a causal analysis. This analysis showed
that the high maternal mortality rate was due to the conditions of gender inequality to-
gether with inappropriate geographic, economic, social and cultural barriers that pre-
vented access to healthcare facilities. In regard to the latter, the reasons stated for not 
having access to healthcare services were: lack of respect for women’s human rights; 
lack of understanding by health workers and medical doctors concerning the traditions 
and customs of expectant mothers; and failure to take into account their traditional 
needs, conditions and birthing practices. The non-use of the health centres resulted in 
many Andean women giving birth at their homes in very poor sanitary conditions. To 
address the lack of access to healthcare facilities, UNICEF and its local partners, in-
cluding local NGOs and health workers, met with the rights-holders, the Andean 
women, as well as the duty-bearers, the government and local health officials. The idea 
was to plan a healthcare delivery system that would respect women’s rights, including 
their cultural practices. Such types of active, free and meaningful participation of An-
dean women in the development process had been almost non-existent up to that 
day.148 Referring to the RBA, O’Neill points out that: “This dual approach: strengthening 
the capacity of the rights holder to understand that health care is a right and then help-
ing them to design a strategy to assert and claim this right while simultaneously work-
ing with the duty bearers to improve their capacity to fulfil their obligations is the hall-
mark of the rights-based approach.”149 The strategy finally agreed upon by all parties 
was to enhance the demand for maternity care by uniting the Andean women’s cultural 
147 See O’Neill, An Introduction to the Concept of Rights-Based Approach to Development: A Paper for 
InterAction, 5.
148 See O’Neill, An Introduction to the Concept of Rights-Based Approach to Development: A Paper for 
InterAction, 5. UNICEF, A Review of a UNICEF Country Programme Based on Human Rights: The Case 
of Peru, 34-36.
149 O’Neill, An Introduction to the Concept of Rights-Based Approach to Development: A Paper for InterAc-
tion, 5.
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practices and the modern medical methods. In the end, this new strategy provided so-
cially and culturally appropriate birthing practices while at the same time informing the 
women and their community of the necessary safety issues.150 In terms of the success 
of this strategy, O’Neill concludes that “this root-cause, participatory, cross-sectoral, 
dual purpose capacity-building exercise created a revolutionary approach to increasing 
the use of health care facilities leading to a dramatic reduction in maternal deaths.”151
Having discussed the evolution and main components of, and scholars’ perspectives 
on, the RBA to development, the chapter will now turn to NEPAD. The African devel-
opment programme is heavily criticised for its insufficient application of this approach.
2.4 NEPAD
2.4.1 Overview of NEPAD and Its Base Document
NEPAD was the result of the merger of two separate development programmes put 
forth under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The first pro-
gramme was the so-called Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP), which was intro-
duced at the Davos Forum in January 2001 by the South African President, Thabo 
Mbeki. It was supported by the Heads of State of Algeria, Adbelaziz Bouteflika, and 
Nigeria, Olusegun Obansanjo. The president of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, around the 
same time presented his development programme, the so-called OMEGA initiative. 
The MAP and the OMEGA were merged at the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in 
Sirte in March 2001 to form the New African Initiative (NAI). At the 37th ordinary session 
of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHSG) on 11 July 2001 in Lu-
saka, the NAI was approved in the form of a declaration. Also, the summit established 
the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), now consist-
ing of 20 African states, whose responsibility is the political leadership of the develop-
ment programme. The HSGIC held their first meeting on 23 October 2001 in Abuja, 
Nigeria where the NAI was changed into the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
and the NEPAD base document was finally adopted.152 The execution phase of 
NEPAD began in 2003 with the implementation of the short-term plan of action lasting
150 See O’Neill, An Introduction to the Concept of Rights-Based Approach to Development: A Paper for 
InterAction, 5. UNICEF, A Review of a UNICEF Country Programme Based on Human Rights: The Case 
of Peru, 34-36.
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tion, 5.
152 See HSGIC, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
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from 2003 until 2006.153 Theoretically, NEPAD is the principal development programme 
of the African Union (AU), however, NEPAD is still in the process of being integrated 
into the existing structures of the AU Commission.154 In regard to its legal standing, it 
has to be emphasised that NEPAD is not a legally binding document. Yet, Sidiki Kaba, 
President of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), points out that 
“though this Declaration has no binding value from a legal point of view, adopting Dec-
larations instead of Decisions takes on a specific significance and solemnity, which 
underlines the vivid expectations of the OAU that its member countries will respect the 
principles enshrined in the Base Document.”155 In addition, Kaba explains that the Dec-
laration is based on a number of legal obligations that the African states are obliged to 
adhere to.156
The NEPAD base document consists of a total of seven separate sections. The first 
paragraph of the introductory part of the document announces the aims and the vision 
of this newly established development programme. It states: 
This New Partnership for Africa’s Development is a pledge by African 
leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, 
that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their 
countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable 
growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in 
the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the 
determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from 
the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising 
world.157
Further paragraphs of this first section highlight the present crisis situation in Africa 
and reaffirm the need for positive change in this respect.158 Section 2 of the NEPAD 
base document emphasises Africa’s rich resource base including mineral, ecological 
and cultural resources. This is followed by a description of the historical impoverish-
ment of the African continent mainly due to the legacy of colonialism. Finally, this sec-
tion focuses on the need for the successful integration of Africa into the globalisation 
153 See FIDH, A Human Rights Approach to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and 
the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 23-25.
154 See UN General Assembly, Kofi Annan, New Partnership for Africa’s Development: Second Consoli-
dated Report on Progress in Implementation and International Support, 4 August 2004, A/59/206, 10.
155 FIDH, A Human Rights Approach to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the 
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156 See FIDH, A Human Rights Approach to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and 
the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 30.
157 HSGIC, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), para. 1.
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process.159 The third section centres on the new political will of African leaders after 
decades of failed development programmes due to external but also internal factors, 
such as questionable African leadership. In this new development programme, African 
leaders accept to take joint responsibility for, among others:
- Promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in their re-
spective countries and regions, by developing clear standards of ac-
countability, transparency and participatory governance at the na-
tional and sub-national levels;
- Revitalising and extend the provision of education, technical training 
and health services, with high priority given to tackling HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other communicable diseases;
- Promoting the role of women in social and economic development 
by reinforcing their capacity in the domains of education and train-
ing;
- Building the capacity of the states in Africa to set and enforce the 
legal framework, as well as maintaining law and order.160
Section 4 of the NEPAD base document consists of an appeal to the peoples of Africa 
to take part in countering the further marginalisation of the African continent and in 
advancing its development by entering into a partnership with the industrialised coun-
tries.161 Therefore, the African leaders ask their peoples to “take up the challenge of 
mobilising in support of the implementation of this initiative by setting up, at all levels, 
structures for organisation, mobilisation and action.”162 The longest part of the docu-
ment is section 5 on NEPAD’s Programme of Action, which lays out the concrete strat-
egy for achieving sustainable development in Africa in the 21st century. As such, the 
Programme of Action is divided into three steps to achieve the aforementioned goal. 
These are: the conditions for sustainable development, including NEPAD’s various 
initiatives (i.e. the Peace and Security Initiative, the Democracy and Political Govern-
ance Initiative and the Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative); sectoral priori-
ties, including infrastructure, agriculture, environment and culture; and the mobilisation 
of resources through schemes such as the Capital Flows Initiative and the Market Ac-
cess Initiative.163 Section 6 focuses on the establishment of a new global partnership 
with developed countries and multilateral organisations. It highlights the mutual bene-
fits that both sides, Africa and its partners, can derive from such a global partnership 
159 See HSGIC, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), paras. 9-41.
160 HSGIC, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), para. 49.
161 See HSGIC, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), para. 55.
162 HSGIC, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), para. 56.
163 See HSGIC, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), paras. 59-173.
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dedicated to upholding existing obligations, which furthers the development of the con-
tinent.164 Finally, section 7 deals with the implementation of NEPAD. To begin with, the 
initiating presidents list four programmes that need to be fast-tracked due to their out-
standing importance in fighting poverty and achieving sustainable development in Af-
rica. These are:
(a) Communicable diseases – HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis;
(b) Information and Communications Technology;
(c) Debt reduction;
(d) Market access.165
In addition to these programmes, the HSGIC name a number of projects to be imple-
mented to advance integrated regional development. These include projects on agri-
culture, infrastructure and regional integration. Lastly, a needs assessment will be un-
dertaken to calculate the needs in the five priority sectors in relation to structures and 
staff.166
With regard to positive reactions towards NEPAD, the newly established African de-
velopment programme is mainly being hailed for three reasons. Most significantly, de-
veloped countries as well as academics and NGOs within Africa welcome the fact that 
NEPAD is an African-led and African-owned initiative, originating out of Africa itself. 
This is regarded as important since today the issue of ‘ownership’ is perceived as a 
significant prerequisite to pursue successful human, social and economic development 
in developing countries.167 In addition to this, there are two more explanations why the 
new African development programme received a broad-based welcome particularly in 
the West. Axel Harneit-Sievers points out that the industrialised countries are in favour 
of the fact that NEPAD characterises a joint attempt by African heads of state and gov-
ernment to establish a programme, which fights poverty and improves social and eco-
nomic development. Thus, he claims that NEPAD has “a strong ‘pan-African’ dimen-
sion to it.”168 Moreover, it has been argued by some scholars that NEPAD is being 
164 See HSGIC, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), paras. 174-188.
165 HSGIC, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), para. 189.
166 See HSGIC, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), paras. 191-200.
167 See Axel Harneit-Sievers, “NEPAD: Context and Issues. A European Perspective,” Journal of Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights 1, no. 3 (2002): 113. Rachel Hayman, “Wooing the West or Champion-
ing Africa? NEPAD’s Vision for African Integration,” in The New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD): Internal and External Visions, ed. Rachel Hayman, Kenneth King and Simon McGrath, 1-22 
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hailed in the West for its utilisation of neo-liberal language, which relates closely to the 
language employed in donor policy papers.169 As Ian Taylor puts it, the message 
communicated by NEPAD “fitted the global neo-liberal discourse rather than seriously 
interrogating the international political economy.”170 However, apart from the above-
mentioned positive reactions towards this programme, which come mostly from the 
West, criticisms about NEPAD exist in abundance. Consequently, general and human 
rights-related disapproval concerning this development programme will be further ex-
plored in the next two sections.
2.4.2 General Criticisms Regarding NEPAD
An examination of the literature on NEPAD reveals that there exist three recurring ma-
jor criticisms in regard to Africa’s principal development programme. The first critique, 
standing in complete contrast to the West’s perception elaborated above, relates to the 
theory of neo-liberalism. This theory claims that integration into the globalised economy 
takes place through the liberalisation of markets and the free flow of capital.171 Various 
authors argue that these neo-liberal economic principles underlie the NEPAD, despite 
having caused great harm on the continent of Africa in the past.172 As Eddy Maloka 
points out, NEPAD is a corroboration of the so-called post-Washington Consensus and 
its neo-liberal prescriptions. It is a repackaging of the infamous SAPs so heavily em-
ployed by the IFIs, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).173 In fact, Pieter Fourie and Brendan Vickers as well as Yash Tandon emphasise
that the NEPAD base document does mention the failure of SAPs only superficially. 
Also, it refrains from investigating some of its harsher effects on the African people, the 
latter’s reproaches not being mentioned at all.174 Considering the above, Tandon right-
fully asks the question: “Kann eine solche Renaissance tatsächlich greifen, wenn sich 
169 See Hayman, “Wooing the West or Championing Africa? NEPAD’s Vision for African Integration,” 4. Ian 
Taylor, “Commentary: The New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the Zimbabwe Elections: Impli-
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171 See Yash Tandon, “Noble Ziele – Schlechte Wege,” afrika süd 3 (2002): 25.
172 See Neville Alexander, “Panafrikanismus in Zeiten der Globalisierung,” afrika süd 2 (2004): 23. Confer-
ence on Civil Society, “Conference on Civil Society and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) – Communiqué,” Journal of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1, no. 3 (2002): 123. Pieter 
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173 See Maloka, “Nepad and Africa’s Future,” 65.
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Afrika weiter in ein asymmetrisches globalisiertes System integriert, das von wenigen 
Ländern dominiert wird?”175 (Can such a renaissance indeed work if Africa continues to 
integrate itself into an asymmetrical globalised system, which is dominated by only a 
few countries?) (translation own). NEPAD, he explains, is very clear on this matter, the 
document favouring the integration of Africa since its heads of state and government 
do not see an alternative to the integration into a neo-liberal globalised model of devel-
opment.176 However, as Henning Melber points out, critics see the danger that this will 
lead to a legitimisation of the existing inequality in the world instead of the declared 
restructuring to reduce it. This situation, then, upholds the powerless and vulnerable
dependency of African states.177
A second criticism repeatedly voiced by scholars is the argument that NEPAD seems 
to be more addressed to the West and its priorities (i.e. neo-liberalism) than to its own 
people, whom the development programme is actually for.178 Tandon simply but never-
theless plainly observes that “the people are asked to join after the leaders have con-
sulted with the donor community and the private sector, chronologically (and materially) 
putting the agreement with the donors before that with the people.”179 Whereas Konrad 
Melchers describes this trend as a “Diskurs im Elfenbeinturm”180 (discourse in the ivory 
tower) (translation own), Fourie and Vickers state that NEPAD is increasingly perceived 
as “sycophancy aimed at a First World audience.”181 As a consequence, Eze Onyek-
pere as well as the Conference on Civil Society question the legitimacy of NEPAD and 
raise the matter as to whom this development programme is accountable.182 That in 
mind, Onyekpere argues that Africa’s leaders are of the opinion that the legitimacy of 
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the NEPAD process lies in its acceptance by the West and not by Africans them-
selves.183
Finally, a third criticism debated in relation to NEPAD concerns the lack of a provision, 
which sets out the obligations by donors to support Africa in its international debt and 
trade issues.184 In terms of foreign debt, Fourie and Vickers as well as Neville Gabriel 
reveal that the matter of the cancellation of debt is only referred to superficially in the 
NEPAD base document. Thus, it plays only a minor part in the development pro-
gramme.185 However, as Fourier and Vickers argue, the debt issue is at the core of 
Africa’s inability to allocate resources and should, therefore, receive much more atten-
tion.186 Concerning the aspect of international trade, similar arguments can be ob-
served. Both, Fourie and Vickers and also Onyekpere maintain that NEPAD barely 
touches the issue of the renegotiation of international terms of trade despite its unfair-
ness towards African countries.187 Commenting on the World Trade Organisation’s 
(WTO) framework and the African development programme, Onyekpere explains: 
“NEPAD sees nothing wrong with the current process of world trade under the WTO 
that is skewed against African countries and makes no strong recommendations for 
renegotiation.”188
2.4.3 NEPAD’s Lack of an RBA to Development
All of the states that are members of NEPAD are also parties to the major international 
human rights conventions, thereby declaring that they have a legal obligation to re-
spect, protect and fulfil fundamental human rights. In addition, these states have signed 
the Constitutive Act of the AU, which has among its objectives the promotion and pro-
tection of human rights. Moreover, all NEPAD member states are parties to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.189 Finally, NEPAD’s Declaration on Democ-
racy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, established in July 2002, also 
183 See Onyekpere, “Perspectives on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development,” 15.
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affirms member states’ commitments to African and international human rights instru-
ments.190 Consequently, there exist a vast number of obligations for NEPAD to ac-
knowledge the existing international human rights framework and to comply with it.191
Nevertheless, various authors observe that the NEPAD document does not include 
human rights language to affirm its development goals, thus lacking an RBA to devel-
opment.192 While Magnus Killander defends the programme by pointing out that “hu-
man rights are not the main focus in … the NEPAD declaration,”193 Sengupta com-
ments on the current situation as follows: “NEPAD does not yet explicitly state the cen-
trality (or primacy) of human rights. Rather, human rights concerns ... are addressed as 
broadly defined actions. The principles and objectives of human rights are not suffi-
ciently woven or integrated into the overall strategic plan of action.”194 While this state-
ment is rather general in its character, a few scholars make specific arguments in re-
gard to NEPAD’s insufficient dealing with rights and, in particular, with ESC rights. 
Manby, the Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC) and the NGO 
Rights and Democracy point out that ESC rights are only vaguely referred to as an is-
sue of access to greater services, however, not as concrete rights that provide legal 
entitlements to these services.195 Yet, Manby warns that “without this type of commit-
ment, NEPAD risks endorsing skewed development of the type found in many re-
source-rich African countries ... where only a small minority has benefitted from those 
riches.”196 Having commented on human rights in general, the following paragraphs will 
look at particular rights where the lack of an RBA to NEPAD becomes most evident.
Criticism of NEPAD has been harshest over the question of public consultation and
participation. This issue has been mentioned by almost every source that writes on 
Africa’s new development programme. A great number of scholars argue that there 
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exists an enormous lack of participation due to NEPAD’s engagement in a so-called 
top-down approach, the NEPAD document thus having limited political legitimacy.197
This is despite the fact that the NEPAD base document itself speaks of ownership of 
the African peoples and asks them to unite for this cause. Paragraph 51 of the docu-
ment states: “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development will be successful only if it 
is owned by the African peoples united in their diversity.”198 However, as Ronald La-
bonte et al. point out, African civil society was not consulted during the formulation 
phase of NEPAD. Consultation only took place after African heads of state had pre-
sented the new development programme to the G8 summit in Genoa in 2001 and the 
World Economic Forum in New York in 2002. Moreover, the authors maintain that 
NEPAD’s Initial Action Plan and the Summary of the NEPAD Action Plan have not 
been available as hard copies until July 2002 while other NEPAD documents are not 
accessible to the public at all.199 Similarly, the South African newspaper, The Citizen,
affirms that according to a Markinor survey, 80 per cent of the population of South Af-
rica had never heard of NEPAD by July 2002.200 Indeed, as Ross Herbert reports, the 
Senegalese President, Abdoulaye Wade, at a meeting of African leaders in Nairobi 
admitted that there has not been much effort to describe NEPAD to the population or 
ministers and civil servants.201 Wade concluded that “we have much to do in the way of 
explaining and communicating about Nepad. We haven’t yet done what we should do 
on this.”202 Nevertheless, Amnesty International USA (AIUSA) claims that it is ex-
tremely important to include civil society as central partners in the formulation, imple-
mentation and evaluation of NEPAD if Africa’s new development programme is sup-
posed to lead to success in terms of sustainable growth and development.203
Another aspect where criticism on NEPAD is widespread concerns the lack of attention 
to the issue of HIV/AIDS. Rights and Democracy declares that HIV/AIDS has such a 
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severe negative impact on the population of Africa that it poses one of the most signifi-
cant threats to the well-being of millions of Africans, now as well as in the future.204
Similarly, Manby notes that HIV/AIDS is the most serious development challenge pres-
ently confronting the continent of Africa, next to war.205 In fact, a report released by the 
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the World Health Organi-
sation (WHO) states that at the end of the year 2005 more than 60 per cent of all peo-
ple living in sub-Saharan Africa, or about 25.8 million, were HIV-positive. Moreover, 3.2
million people became newly infected in 2005. Approximately 2.4 million died of the 
disease.206 Nevertheless, various scholars point out that NEPAD fails not only to rec-
ognise the seriousness of the pandemic but also falls short of providing a strategy for 
addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis.207 The UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for 
HIV/AIDS, Stephen Lewis, rightfully asks how one can talk about the future of sub-
Saharan Africa without taking into account the major issue of HIV/AIDS.208 He criticises 
NEPAD’s approach to HIV/AIDS by stating: 
for all its talk of trade, and investment, and governance, and corruption, 
and matters relating to financial architecture, there is only a pro forma 
sense of the social sectors, only modest references to the human side 
of the ledger. And in fashion quite startling, in fact, disturbingly startling, 
NEPAD hardly mentions HIV/AIDS at all ... unless we deal with 
HIV/AIDS, all the proud declarations of NEPAD are doomed.209
Connected to the issue of HIV/AIDS is the right to health, which Labonte et al. argue, is 
not perceived as a legal obligation in NEPAD. Rather, they maintain, health is seen as 
a means to achieve economic growth.210 Similarly, FIDH claims that ESC rights, includ-
ing education and health, are not recognised as human rights where there is the dis-
tinction of rights-holders and duty-bearers. Instead, NEPAD looks at the economic 
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profit that can be derived from an efficient health system, turning “what should be an 
objective into a mere development instrument.”211
Criticism is also present regarding the issue of women’s rights and, thus, gender ine-
quality within NEPAD. Generally, it is widely known that incidents of conflict and pov-
erty have had a particularly damaging impact on the female population of Africa, 
women being disproportionately harmed by economic and development policies.212 Yet, 
scholars have repeatedly argued that, despite NEPAD’s affirmation to “promote the role 
of women in social and economic development,”213 the African development pro-
gramme does lack an adequate gender analysis.214 AIUSA claims that the goal of 
NEPAD to empower women appears to be more “of a gesture to political correctness” 
than a truly pursued aim, not referring to any of the challenges women presently 
face.215 More specifically, FIDH maintains that NEPAD falls short of addressing the 
particular effects of economic policies, which often lead to gender inequality.216 Among 
the economic policies affecting men and women differently and, in fact, harming the 
latter are SAPs and trade liberalisation policies.217 Equally so, the Gender and Eco-
nomic Reforms in Africa (GERA) Programme states that NEPAD “does not take into 
account the social relations within the market, in particular those of power that underlie 
the rules, access to and control over resources and activities in the market.”218 More-
over, GERA points out that this failure to address social and gender inequalities per-
petuates the marginalisation of women and other underprivileged groups in the market 
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system.219 However, NEPAD’s aim to integrate itself into the world economy and, in 
addition, to reach a status of sustainable growth and development depends on the suc-
cessful integration of all African people into the development process. FIDH makes 
unequivocally clear that: “As a program specifically aimed at getting Africa out of its
current marginalized position in the world economy, NEPAD cannot afford to let certain 
categories of the African populations remain outside the development process.”220
The list of issues where NEPAD lacks an RBA to development could be continued. 
Among other aspects, one could expand on the development programme’s limited ref-
erence to the most vulnerable, to the right to education and to workers’ rights.221 How-
ever, since it has become clear by now that NEPAD does indeed lack an RBA, the last 
paragraph will focus on NEPAD and the Zimbabwe elections. This instance has often 
been called the test case for evaluating the programme’s credibility.222 In addition, this 
event can also serve as the test case for assessing NEPAD’s adherence to an RBA. 
Despite the NEPAD base document stressing that “Africa undertakes to respect the 
global standards of democracy, which core components include political pluralism, al-
lowing for the existence of several political parties and workers’ unions, fair, open, free 
and democratic elections periodically organised to enable the populace choose their 
leaders freely,”223 Africa’s new development programme failed to adhere to this prom-
ise in the Zimbabwean elections in 2001. Instead of holding elections as envisioned 
above, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and his political party, the Zimbabwe 
African National Union-Patriotic Front, violated these internationally agreed-upon stan-
dards. Mugabe and his party attempted to keep hold of their political power at all costs. 
Rather than trying to change the unfolding situation in Zimbabwe at the time, many 
African leaders, South African President Thabo Mbeki being only one example, posi-
tioned themselves behind Mugabe.224 As Onyekpere stresses, the Nigerian delegation 
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which monitored the Zimbabwean elections declared the voting to have been fair, 
open, free and democratic. The South African delegation, while admitting that there 
had been some problems initiated by the government and the opposition, nevertheless 
announced that the elections were legitimate.225 As a consequence, many scholars 
view the test case of Zimbabwe as having diminished NEPAD’s authority as a success-
ful development programme for Africa’s renewal. Taylor explains that within the context 
of NEPAD, the Zimbabwe elections were a clear opportunity for African leaders to 
prove that they had learned to include tolerance and democracy into their politics. Nev-
ertheless, they completely missed this opportunity.226 Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of 
Zimbabwe’s opposition Movement for Democratic Change, summarises the problem 
with NEPAD as follows: “You know this is the saddest thing about Africa, all these 
flowery declarations and all without commitment. There’s no commitment because 
there is no holding to account. ... The declarations are not worth the paper they’re writ-
ten on. Releasing such paper creates a feel-good atmosphere and, when leaders are 
reminded of what they have signed, they retreat into the defence of the sovereignty of 
nations.”227
The paragraphs above present a general overview of the lack of an RBA to NEPAD. 
However, the analysis would be incomplete if the progress being made by NEPAD and 
its partners was not addressed. One of the most recent documents reporting on these 
achievements is the Third Consolidated Report on Progress in Implementation and 
International Support prepared by Annan for the General Assembly in August 2005. 
Compared to the various human rights-related issues mentioned above, the greatest 
progress has been achieved in the area of HIV/AIDS. Annan states that the NEPAD 
Steering Committee has adopted a ‘Fight Against AIDS’ plan, which concentrates on 
HIV/AIDS’ impact on the African continent. Moreover, HIV/AIDS has become a major 
part in all of NEPAD’s programmes.228 Similarly, progress has been reported in the 
fields of health, education, gender mainstreaming and civil society involvement.229 Yet, 
this does not suggest that the criticism voiced has vanished. For example, despite the 
fact that there now exists determination on the part of NEPAD to involve civil society in 
225 See Onyekpere, “Perspectives on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development,” 21.
226 See Taylor, “Commentary: The New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the Zimbabwe Elections: 
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the implementation of NEPAD programmes and actions,230 this move, one could argue, 
comes a little too late. After all, NEPAD has been Africa’s socio-economic development 
programme for almost five years now. A parallel argument can be made for the aspect 
of gender mainstreaming, the NEPAD secretariat at last having established a unit on 
gender issues in September 2004.231 Finally, although progress in these areas is being 
made, there is neither an indication nor an outright declaration that this is done in a 
human rights-based manner. The progress report at no point mentions the RBA to de-
velopment, let alone its implementation to NEPAD. This indicates that NEPAD still fails 
to integrate human rights standards and principles into its development programme. So 
the question still remains as to why this is so? One possible answer is that there exist 
various obstacles to implementing an RBA to NEPAD. Consequently, the following 
chapter identifies the principal economic impediment: SAPs employed by the World 
Bank.
230 See Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, 12.
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Chapter 3
3. Identification of the World Bank’s SAPs as the Major Economic Obstacle to 
Implementing an RBA to NEPAD
Undeniably, one could discover a wide range of obstacles to implementing an RBA to 
NEPAD. Law-related, political, cultural or even technical hindrances come to mind. 
However, this thesis concentrates on the principal economic impediment to applying an 
RBA to NEPAD: the so-called SAPs. Why the focus is on SAPs in particular is best 
explained by the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network 
(SAPRIN). It states: “One factor, more than any other, has crippled national economies, 
increased poverty and inequality, and made millions of people hungry. It is a set of 
policies, called structural adjustment, that has been forced on developing countries for 
more than 20 years by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and Western 
aid agencies.”232 Due to the major negative impact that SAPs have had on developing 
countries’ national economies and human rights-related matters, the project will con-
centrate solely on this aspect. Moreover, it can be gathered from the above quotation
that the World Bank plays a significant part in the employment of SAPs in developing 
states. In fact, Chris Jochnick points out that the Bank is the principal source of interna-
tional funding for development programmes of Third World countries.233 Consequently, 
the thesis focuses exclusively on the World Bank as a key provider of SAPs.234
Because the question often arises as to how the World Bank can be linked to the field 
of human rights, the chapter will start off with a discussion on the Bank and its relation-
ship to this particular subject. It will be argued that this IFI does have universal human 
rights obligations; yet the World Bank, despite increasingly engaging in human rights-
related work, denies this responsibility. To a large degree, this attitude becomes ap-
parent in the organisation’s deployment of SAPs in developing countries, especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa. But what exactly are these SAPs? An introduction to SAPs follows 
232 Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN), Structural Adjustment: The 
SAPRI Report; The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty and Inequality (London: Zed Books, 2004), 
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the World Bank and human rights section. The last segment reveals SAPs, as utilised 
by the World Bank, as the major economic obstacle to implementing an RBA to 
NEPAD.
3.1 The World Bank and Human Rights
3.1.1 Evolution of the World Bank
The years after World War I were characterised by economic tensions and conflicts 
between states due to the high costs associated with war debts and the recovering of 
the economy. To prevent a recurrence of these problems after World War II, represen-
tatives from 44 countries met in July 1944 in the town of Bretton Woods, New Hamp-
shire, to establish an international institutional framework for future economic coopera-
tion. In addition to the creation of the IMF and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, the Bretton Woods conference led to the establishment of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The IBRD is now one of the five institu-
tions within the World Bank Group. It was formed to assist postwar reconstruction in 
Europe as well as economic development in developing countries with long-term loans. 
However, because the former task proved to be beyond the IBRD’s available re-
sources, the United States launched a European Recovery Programme, also known as 
the Marshall Plan, which took over the mission of European reconstruction. The IBRD, 
as a consequence, started focussing on providing financial assistance to the economic 
development of the Third World.235 During its first 15 years of existence it became ap-
parent that there are two types of less developed countries (LDCs): middle-income 
LDCs and low-income LDCs. It was acknowledged that the poorest LDCs needed pref-
erential terms to be able to borrow money and so in 1960 the industrialised states 
agreed on establishing the International Development Association (IDA). The IDA of-
fered long-term soft loans at zero interest to low-income LDCs compared to the rather 
high interest rate hard loans of the IBRD.236 Today, the World Bank consists of four
multilateral financial institutions and one non-financial institution: the IBRD - 1945; the 
IDA - 1960; the International Finance Cooperation - 1956; the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency - 1988; and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes - 1966, respectively.237 Future reference to the IFI of the World Bank should 
235 See Theodore Cohn, Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 
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be understood as particular reference to the IBRD and the IDA, for they are the two 
institutions within the World Bank Group financially supporting developing countries on 
the premise of the employment of SAPs.
3.1.2 The Gradual Integration of Human Rights Into the World Bank’s Work
When the World Bank was established in 1945, no direct link was made to the issue of 
international human rights. For a long time, the fields of financial and human rights op-
erations were seen as two separate undertakings without any influence on each other. 
This perception slowly changed in the 1960s when the UN General Assembly repeat-
edly passed resolutions demanding of the World Bank, as well as of the IMF, to stop 
their financial support to Portugal and South Africa. Both states were guilty of employ-
ing the human rights violating regime of apartheid at the time. Another major shift oc-
curred in the 1980s with the introduction by the Bank of SAPs. Because of the negative 
social effects of SAPs experienced by developing countries over time, a more profound 
link was established between the IFI’s policies and the national human rights situation 
in Third World states.238 This development was further supported by the changing na-
ture of international human rights law. While until 1945 international human rights law 
did not take into account national level domestic affairs of states, this situation changed 
with the adoption of the United Nations Charter and the heightened focus on human 
rights as one of the four purposes of the newly created UN.239 The subsequent years 
saw the acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the 
coming into force of the ICCPR and the ICESCR in 1976. As Rhona Smith explains, 
together these instruments “form the foundation of international human rights protec-
tion, as advocated by the United Nations.”240 The growing significance of international 
human rights law was accompanied by an expansion in the number of international 
organisations, which increasingly engaged in multilateral international interactions in-
fluencing countries’ national policies.241 In reiterating today’s strong link between inter-
national human rights and international organisations, such as the World Bank, Sigrun 
Skogly maintains: “As international actors are becoming more important in international 
238 See Sigrun Skogly, The Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001), 6, 36.
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co-operation, and not least their increased influence on national policies, their impact –
positive and negative – on human rights deserves attention.”242
Although the Bank is still reluctant to make regular use of the term ‘human rights’, it has 
nevertheless begun to take human rights-related issues into account when these inter-
fere with its economic activities.243 For example, Operational Directive 4.20 on indige-
nous peoples, which was issued by the IFI in September 1991, includes one of the first 
explicit references to human rights.244 Seven years later, the World Bank published the 
report Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank that focused on 
the institution’s operations and human rights.245 Finally, Bahram Ghazi states that the 
World Bank in recent years has developed activities, which incorporate the notion of 
human rights, including women’s rights, children’s rights, indigenous rights, labour 
rights and the rights to education and health.246 Thus, it should be acknowledged at this 
point that the Bank has, to a certain extent, acted upon the criticisms voiced by many 
related to its projects’ and operations’ negative impact on human rights.247 However, 
despite these improvements of the IFI’s integration of human rights into its work over 
the last years, obstacles persist. Most importantly, the World Bank continues to deny 
any legal obligations towards international human rights standards.248 Whether this 
attitude is based on legitimate reasons and can thus be upheld or whether, instead, the 
Bank is legally obliged to respect, protect and fulfil international human rights, will be 
explored in the following section.
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3.1.3 A Fundamental Debate: The World Bank’s International Legal Obligations To-
wards Human Rights
Before an inquiry can be made into the question of the World Bank’s international legal 
obligations towards human rights, it has to be proven whether the financial institution 
possesses international legal personality. If this is so, the Bank can be referred to as a 
subject of international law and can, thus, be held accountable for the activities where 
misconduct has been discovered. Due to the limited scope of a Masters thesis and, 
more importantly, the acknowledgement by many authors that the World Bank does 
possess international legal personality,249 this topic will not be discussed any further. 
Instead, the following discussion derives from the well-established assumption that the 
Bank does have international legal personality. As Jean Ziegler, the Special Rappor-
teur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on the right to food, stated in 
a recent report: “There is no question today that international organizations such as the 
World Bank, IMF and WTO have legal personality under international law.”250
Having confirmed the international legal personality of the World Bank, this section will 
now turn to the most popular reasons presented over the years by the Bank and its 
supporters for denying its international legal obligations towards human rights. Each 
argument will be followed by one or more counter-arguments put forward by human 
rights advocates, thereby providing the reader with a broad overview of the fundamen-
tal debate in this particular field of study.
3.1.3.1 The World Bank’s ‘Political Prohibition’ Article
The cornerstone of the World Bank’s argumentation against the institution’s interna-
tional human rights obligations is to be found in the Bank’s charter, the so-called Arti-
cles of Agreement. Article IV, Section 10 of the Articles of Agreement of the IBRD, as 
well as the IDA equivalent, spell out the IFI’s mandate as an organisation in relation to 
its members. The paragraph states that:
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any 
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political 
character of the member or members concerned. Only economic con-
siderations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations 
249 See Darrow, Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and Inter-
national Human Rights Law, 126. Ghazi, The IMF, the World Bank Group and the Question of Human 
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shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in 
Article I (emphasis added).251
This section is also referred to as the ‘political prohibition’ clause since it disallows the 
Bank to take into account political considerations in the dealings with its members. 
Categorising human rights as belonging to the domestic political affairs of its members, 
the financial institution argues that the issue of human rights falls beyond its mandate 
and, hence, the scope of its permissible activities. Only economic considerations can 
be taken into account.252
This principal argument put forward by the World Bank in an attempt to deny its inter-
national human rights obligations has met resistance on various levels. To begin with, 
both Mac Darrow and Ghazi point to the fact that the Bank’s activities have always 
been subject to politics. Darrow maintains that the terms ‘economic’ and ‘political’ have 
been artificially and falsely divided and that this became apparent in the IFI’s activities 
in the 1980s and 1990s.253 Although he does not mention them by name, it can be 
safely assumed that Darrow, among other aspects, is referring to the Bank’s deploy-
ment of SAPs during that time. In more detail, Ghazi highlights that the World Bank, by 
demanding developing countries to employ SAPs so that funding by the institution will 
be provided, intervenes in the economies of these states. This, he argues, can certainly 
be perceived as a political act.254 “The corollary is,” Darrow sums up, “that just about 
everything that the Bank does is ‘political.’”255
A second argument is put forward by Skogly who maintains that the issue of human 
rights protection can no longer be perceived as a solely domestic political affair. She 
provides the reader with three reasons to support her statement: (a) Because the pro-
motion of human rights is one of the major purposes of the United Nations as spelled 
out in its Charter, the non-intervention article, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, cannot be 
taken into consideration as an obstacle to the international engagement in human 
251 IBRD, Articles of Agreement, as amended effective 16 February, 1989, Art. IV, Section 10.
252 See Ghazi, The IMF, the World Bank Group and the Question of Human Rights, 111. Jochnick, “Con-
fronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the Promotion of Human Rights,” 70. Skogly, The 
Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 94.
253 See Darrow, Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and Inter-
national Human Rights Law, 192.
254 See Ghazi, The IMF, the World Bank Group and the Question of Human Rights, 87-88.
255 Darrow, Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 192.
52
rights.256 Article 2(7) forbids the UN to intervene in “matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any State.”257 (b) After the adoption of the UN Charter in 
1945, the following years have seen the coming into force of a number of international 
human rights conventions, thereby adding increased strength to the issue of human 
rights in international law. (c) Finally, around two-thirds of the world’s countries have 
now ratified some or all of the afore-mentioned conventions, thus further promoting the 
internationalisation of human rights.258 Related to this argument is Ghazi’s claim that 
the aspect of non-intervention has become a theoretical matter only. Acknowledging 
that “human rights have been perceived as interfering in states affairs,” he poses the 
question: “Yet, hasn’t the evolution of international relations, in the direction of greater 
interdependence, made the ‘non-intervention’ issue theoretical? Isn’t there already an 
economic and financial situation where intervention is unavoidable?”259
A last argument countering the World Bank’s view that its Articles of Agreement shield 
it from legally adhering to international human rights is presented by Ghazi. He con-
tends that while many people identify human rights as a political issue, it is primarily a 
legal matter.260 If the identification of human rights as a political matter was pursued, 
Ghazi explains, the nature of human rights would be denied. As norms which belong to 
the internal and international legal systems, human rights are law and, hence, possess 
the same authority as do other norms that are part of these legal systems.261
To render this discussion complete, it needs to be stated that in the last few years, staff
from within the World Bank have also acknowledged that the ‘political prohibition’ arti-
cle has lost its validity. As Ghazi points out, Mr. Sfeir-Younis, former World Bank’s 
Special Representative in Geneva, certainly shares this opinion. Ghazi writes: “For him, 
the argument that human rights belong to the political realm, in which the WB [World 
Bank] cannot interfere, is no longer credible.”262 Praiseworthy as it may seem, one has 
to keep in mind, however, that not all Bank members share this belief. Therefore, 
words are not necessarily followed by serious action. 
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3.1.3.2 The Relationship Agreement
A second debate concerning the World Bank’s legal obligations towards international 
human rights surrounds the issue of the so-called ‘Relationship Agreement.’ This 
agreement has been interpreted in different ways by the Bank and its supporters on the 
one hand and human rights advocates on the other. The World Bank is a specialised 
agency of the United Nations,263 and as such a contract setting out the relationship 
between the two was drafted by both institutions. However, as Ghazi highlights, an 
agreement was not as easily reached as with other specialised agencies of the UN,
such as the International Labour Organisation, the UNESCO or the Food and Agricul-
ture Organisation. In fact, because the Bank did not perceive itself as part of the UN
system, it drew up its own Relationship Agreement, which was then followed by 
counter-drafts prepared by the UN. The Relationship Agreement, as it is known today, 
is based on these drafts and came into force in August 1947.264 The principal para-
graph that the subsequent discussion will focus on is Article 1(2) of the Relationship 
Agreement. It states:
The Bank is a specialized agency established by agreement among 
its member governments and having wide international responsibili-
ties, as defined in its Articles of Agreement, in economic and related 
fields within the meaning of Article 57 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions Charter. By reason of the nature of its international responsibili-
ties, the Bank is, and is required to function as, an independent or-
ganization (emphasis added).265
Despite being a specialised agency of the United Nations, the World Bank concen-
trates on the fact that Article 1(2) of the Relationship Agreement states that the IFI is, 
and has to function as, an independent organisation. According to Ibrahim Shihata, 
former Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank, only Security Council 
decisions under Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter have to be taken into account by 
the Bank.266 So, whereas the financial institution puts the emphasis on the independ-
ence of the Bank from the UN, human rights advocates highlight the status of the Bank 
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rity in case of a threat to one or both. Whereas Art. 41 relates to measures not involving the use of armed 
force, Art. 42 includes those measures. See UN Charter, Arts. 41 and 42.
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as a specialised agency of the UN. On a very basic level, Skogly argues that the corol-
lary of the Relationship Agreement must be that there are certain rights and obligations 
for the World Bank towards the UN. She notes: “One would … assume that part of the 
reasoning behind bringing these organisations [the World Bank and the IMF] into a 
formalised relationship with the UN must have been to grant them, legally and practi-
cally, rights and obligations in relationship to the UN, which would have been different 
if they were not brought into this relationship through the Agreements.”267 Darrow 
agrees with Skogly on this point and adds that the independence of the World Bank as 
stipulated in the Relationship Agreement cannot be taken to mean that the purposes of 
the UN Charter, including human rights, are undermined or jeopardised.268 In fact, al-
ready back in 1991, Danilo Türk, at the time Special Rapporteur of the Sub-
Commission on the Realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, confirmed 
that as a UN agency the World Bank is obliged to adhere to the terms of the UN Char-
ter. This includes the passages on human rights found in Articles 55 and 56 of the 
Charter.269 Similarly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations in a report to the 
Commission on Human Rights in 1996 affirmed that: 
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are international 
governmental institutions that are fully integrated into the United Nations 
system as a specialized agency established by governmental agree-
ment in accordance with Article 57 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
As such, both institutions, like any other United Nations body or any 
other subject of international law, are bound by the Charter of the United 
Nations and have a duty to respect the postulates formulated in the 
Preamble to the Charter, the purposes of the United Nations (Art. 1), the 
principles governing the actions of the Organization and its Members 
(Art. 2), the objectives of the Organization in the area of international 
economic and social cooperation (Arts. 55 and 56), specific provisions 
aimed at their realization and which are contained in the Charter as well 
as in other international instruments including, inter alia, the Interna-
tional Covenants on Human Rights, international conventions, including 
the international labour conventions, and resolutions and declarations of 
the United Nations.270
267 Skogly, The Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 100.
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As can be gathered from the above, Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter play a very 
important part in this discussion. Consequently, they are listed in full below:
55. With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being 
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: 
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of eco-
nomic and social progress and development; 
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related prob-
lems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and 
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion (emphasis added).271
56. All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in 
co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes 
set forth in Article 55.272
Together these articles affirm the UN members’ responsibility towards the promotion of 
“universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.”273
In approving of the significance of Articles 55 and 56 for interpreting the Relationship 
Agreement between the World Bank and the United Nations, Darrow states: “Looking 
at Articles 55-57 as a whole, in conjunction with the IMF/UN and Bank/UN Relationship 
Agreements, it is strongly arguable that co-operation between the IFIs and the UN in 
the economic and social fields should be based, at least in part, on the principles ani-
mating Chapter IX of the Charter.”274
Despite much evidence that the Relationship Agreement should be understood as a 
link between the Bank and the UN, which grants the former certain rights and obliga-
tions in connection with the latter, controversies persist. Even human rights scholars 
such as Darrow and Ghazi do acknowledge that the document, and in particular Article
1(2), is problematic.275 Indeed, Ghazi declares that the Relationship Agreement con-
tains two opposite ideas: the integration of the World Bank into one system of interna-
tional organisations on the one hand, and the independence of the financial institution 
271 UN Charter, Art. 55.
272 UN Charter, Art. 56.
273 UN Charter, Art. 55.
274 Darrow, Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 128.
275 See Darrow, Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and Inter-
national Human Rights Law, 125. Ghazi, The IMF, the World Bank Group and the Question of Human 
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on the other. However, while agreeing that a certain degree of independence of the 
Bank was envisaged at the time, Ghazi reminds the reader of two important points: (a) 
It is more than 50 years ago that the Relationship Agreement was drafted, and many 
changes on the international plane have taken place since then. Among others, the 
international human rights regime as well as the World Bank’s own activities have 
grown and progressed. (b) The Agreement cannot be comprehended as a document 
that prohibits the Bank to fulfil international human rights norms and standards.276 In 
conclusion then, focussing on the arguments established above, it can be safely as-
sumed that the World Bank-United Nations Relationship Agreement is another indicator 
for the Bank’s international legal obligations towards human rights.
3.1.3.3 The World Bank’s Members as States Parties to the ICESCR
A final argument that has been put forward by the World Bank and its advocates to 
exempt the institution from any human rights obligations concerns its status as an IGO. 
It has been argued that because the Bank is an organisation and not a state and, 
hence, is not able to become a party to international human rights conventions, it does 
not have responsibilities in the area of human rights.277 However, the counter-argument 
is straightforward and easily explained: human rights scholars claim that the majority of 
the states that are members of this IFI are also members to such conventions as the 
ICESCR and the ICCPR.278 Consequently and “clearly,” as Ziegler noted recently, “in-
ternational organizations cannot be free to do what their constituents are not permitted 
to do.”279 Referring to this line of reasoning, it has been increasingly argued over the 
last few years that states’ international obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human 
rights also apply to the activities of IGOs such as the World Bank that the states are 
members of.280 In fact, the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, drafted in1997, deal with this matter quite intensely.281 Paragraph 19 of 
the Guidelines reads as follows:
276 See Ghazi, The IMF, the World Bank Group and the Question of Human Rights, 123.
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The obligations of States to protect economic, social and cultural rights 
extend also to their participation in international organizations, where 
they act collectively. It is particularly important for States to use their in-
fluence to ensure that violations do not result from the programmes and 
policies of the organizations of which they are members. It is crucial for 
the elimination of violations of economic, social and cultural rights for in-
ternational organizations, including international financial institutions, to 
correct their policies and practices so that they do not result in depriva-
tion of economic, social and cultural rights. Member States of such or-
ganizations, individually or through the governing bodies, as well as the 
secretariat and nongovernmental organizations should encourage and 
generalize the trend of several such organizations to revise their policies 
and programmes to take into account issues of economic, social and 
cultural rights, especially when these policies and programmes are im-
plemented in countries that lack the resources to resist the pressure 
brought by international institutions on their decision-making affecting 
economic, social and cultural rights (emphasis added).282
In a similar vein, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in several of 
its concluding observations, encouraged the state party,
as a member of international organizations, including international fi-
nancial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, to do all it can to ensure that the policies and decisions of 
those organizations are in conformity with the obligations of States Par-
ties under the Covenant, in particular the obligations contained in arti-
cles 2.1, 11, 15, 22, 23 concerning international assistance and coop-
eration.283
The case illustrated above once again supports the claim that the World Bank is legally 
obliged to respect, protect and fulfil international human rights. Taken together, the 
three main arguments presented, including the IFI’s ‘Political Prohibition’ Article, the 
World Bank-United Nations Relationship Agreement and the World Bank-ICESCR 
membership discussion, give enough evidence for most scholars to insist that the Bank 
does have international human rights obligations.284
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3.2 Introduction to SAPs
As previously mentioned, the World Bank is still being heavily criticised for employing 
SAPs in developing countries, thereby violating those people’s CP and ESC rights. 
After informing the reader of the evolution of the doctrine of structural adjustment, the 
section will look at this issue more closely.
3.2.1 Evolution of the Doctrine of Structural Adjustment
The 1980s debt crisis of the developing states was the principal development that led 
to the introduction of SAPs in those countries.285 In general, a debt crisis occurs when 
indebted countries are short of sufficient funds to service the interest payments on their 
debt obligations. In August 1982, Mexico announced exactly that, the incapacity to re-
pay the interest on its debt obligations and the international debt crisis began. The cri-
sis quickly spread to other developing countries that were confronted with private credi-
tor banks’ decrease in their loan exposure.286 Differing opinions exist concerning the 
causes of the international debt crisis. Without going into detail, it is safe to assume 
that a number of factors triggered this crisis, such as: “unexpected changes in the 
global economy, irresponsible behavior of the lenders, irresponsible behavior of the 
debtor countries, and dependence of the Third World countries on the advanced capi-
talist states.”287
In the search for a solution to the debt crisis, in 1985 the then US Secretary of the 
Treasury, James Baker, introduced the doctrine of structural adjustment.288 The policy 
was based on the belief that deep structural problems caused the developing countries’ 
unrelenting trade and fiscal imbalances. To address these structural causes, structural 
reforms had to occur in those countries. Therefore, in order to receive financial assis-
tance from IFIs such as the World Bank to fight the accumulated debt, the debtor coun-
tries had to agree to employ a range of strict economic and structural reforms.289 While 
no SAP is the same in every state, certain characteristics are shared by all these pro-
grammes. Generally, it can be said that SAPs require a country to carry out the follow-
ing policies: a shift from import-substitution to export-led growth; trade and financial 
285 See Robert Gilpin and Jean Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Eco-
nomic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 313.
286 See Cohn, Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice, 188-189.
287 Cohn, Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice, 189.
288 See Joan M. Nelson, “Introduction: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Developing Nations,” in 
Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World, ed. Joan M. Nelson, 3-
32 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 7.
289 See Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order, 314.
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sector liberalisation; privatisation of state-owned enterprises; currency devaluation;
price deregulation; abolishment of subsidies; reduction of the role of the state in the 
economy and the limitation of government spending.290 The World Bank itself defines 
the policy of structural adjustment as follows: “reforms of policies and institutions cover-
ing micro-economic (such as taxes and tariffs), macroeconomic (fiscal policy) and insti-
tutional interventions … designed to improve resource allocation, increase economic 
efficiency, expand growth potential and increase resilience to shocks.”291 The doctrine 
of structural adjustment derived from a notion developed by John Williamson, which he 
introduced as the ‘Washington Consensus.’292 According to Williamson, there was a 
shared understanding among officials in industrial economies and international institu-
tions that for economic development to advance, a country had to commit itself to the 
doctrine of neoliberalism. This doctrine’s emphasis is on free markets, trade liberalisa-
tion and the reduced role for the state in the economy.293
Advocates of SAPs argued that if a debtor country embraced the doctrine of neoliberal-
ism and the related policy of structural adjustment, rapid economic recovery and 
growth would occur in those states. The resulting wealth, it was hoped, would ‘trickle 
down’ to the poorer sections of society, and an improvement in social services would 
also follow.294 As will be seen shortly, this theory did not deliver the promised results. 
On the contrary, many scholars point to the devastating effects SAPs have had on the 
economic and human rights situations in developing countries and, in particular, on the 
continent of Africa.295 In fact, Theodore Cohn emphasises that “the decade of the 
1980s, when more than two-thirds of African states were receiving World Bank and IMF 
SALs [SAPs], is generally considered to be a lost decade for Africa.”296 Among the 
devastating effects experienced by Africa during this time were: stagnation of economic 
growth and industrial production; higher population growth than agricultural output; de-
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cline of per capita incomes and investment; and increase of unemployment.297 In turn, 
a number of economic and social rights were jeopardised and violated such as, for ex-
ample: the right to work; the right to food; the right to an adequate standard of living; 
the right to health; and the right to education.298 As the Special Rapporteur, Reinaldo 
Figueredo, and the Independent Expert, Fantu Cheru, explain so vividly in a joint report 
to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2000: 
for almost 20 years, the international financial institutions and creditor 
Governments were engaged in the self-deceptive and destructive game 
of managing third world economies from afar and forcing unpopular 
economic policies down the throats of powerless third world countries in 
the belief that the bitter medicine of macroeconomic adjustment would 
ultimately put these countries on a path to prosperity and a debt-free ex-
istence. Two decades later, many countries are in worse condition than 
when they started implementing IMF/World Bank structural adjustment 
programmes. The social and ecological costs of these harsh austerity 
programmes have been far-reaching, with many countries experiencing 
a dramatic decline in human development indices (emphasis added).299
The above-mentioned direct and indirect references should give the reader an initial 
impression of the extremely negative effects of the World Bank’s SAPs on developing 
countries’ human rights situations.300 Yet, a more detailed examination of this issue is 
required to identify the Bank’s SAPs as the principal economic obstacle to implement-
ing a human rights-based approach to development in general, and NEPAD in particu-
lar. The following analysis will focus primarily on one recent report published in 2004 by 
SAPRIN and the World Bank. In an attempt to critically assess the effects of the IFI’s
SAPs on developing countries, civil society networks from different states, developing 
country governments and the World Bank collaborated over five years and finally pre-
sented the SAPRI report.301 According to their own judgement, “this book represents 
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the most comprehensive, real-life assessment of the actual impacts of the liberaliza-
tion, deregulation, privatization and austerity policies that constitute structural adjust-
ment programmes.”302
3.3 The World Bank’s SAPs as the Major Economic Obstacle to Implementing an 
RBA to NEPAD
Special Rapporteur Türk, in 1991, listed a range of structural adjustment measures, 
which are responsible for the violation of ESC rights in developing countries. Among 
those are the following: “(a) devaluation of the local currency; (b) decrease of govern-
ment expenditure on public services; (c) abolition of price controls; (d) imposition of 
wage controls; (e) reduction of trade and foreign exchange controls; (f) restrictions on 
domestic credit; (g) reduction of the role of the state in the economy; (h) increasing 
basis for the export community; (i) decreasing imports; and (j) privatization of hereto-
fore public enterprises.”303 The SAPRI report, in its own investigations, also discovers 
that these measures have had, and still have, a negative impact on developing coun-
tries’ human rights. Among the topics examined were: trade liberalisation policies; fi-
nancial sector liberalisation; labour market reform; privatisation; and agricultural sector 
reform.304 Despite the importance of all these issues, the following analysis will focus 
on the last topic addressed in the SAPRI report, titled: “The Effects of Public Expendi-
ture Policies on Education and Healthcare under Structural Adjustment.”305 The latter 
aspect, in particular, has spurred much criticism among human rights advocates. This 
is so because cuts in government spending automatically lead to the removal of subsi-
dies on education and health services, thus impacting negatively on peoples’ rights to 
education and to health in developing countries.306 While a total of seven countries took 
part in the SAPRI investigation, this analysis will concentrate on the results obtained in 
most significantly, of the World Bank itself. Therefore, it is argued that the SAPRI report analyses the prob-
lem adequately.
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the African states of Ghana, Uganda and Zimbabwe. In doing so, the study is directly 
linked to the topic of NEPAD.307
Before examples can be presented where the right to health and the right to education 
were violated in those countries, the exact content of the two rights has to be clarified. 
Both rights have their origin in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights where 
they are mentioned in Articles 25 and 26 respectively.308 However, they did not become 
legally enforceable rights until the coming into force of the ICESCR in 1976. Article 12 
of the Covenant covers the provisions on the right to health. This right is spelled out in 
full below:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant 
to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary 
for:
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mor-
tality and for the healthy development of the child;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hy-
giene;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occu-
pational and other diseases;
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service 
and medical attention in the event of sickness (emphasis added).309
The right to education is listed as Article 13 of the ICESCR. Parts of Article 13 read as 
follows:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to 
the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dig-
nity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. … .
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a 
view to achieving the full realization of this right
(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all;
(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and 
vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and 
307 Not only are Ghana, Uganda and Zimbabwe the African states that took part in the SAPRI study, more-
over, all three countries are members of NEPAD and, thus, a part of the NEPAD framework. Although it is 
acknowledged that three countries do not fully represent Africa as a whole, it is argued that the studies 
undertaken in these countries provide a good overview on this particular matter.
308 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Arts. 25 and 26.
309 ICESCR, Art. 12.
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accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the 
progressive introduction of free education;
(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively 
pursued, an adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the 
material conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously improved
(emphasis added).310
Having established the legal backgrounds on the right to health and the right to educa-
tion, how then did cuts in government spending lead to a violation of these two human 
rights? The decrease in government spending is achieved through the implementation 
of spending controls, cost-sharing schemes and revenue increases. In more detail, the 
following fiscal and monetary policies were employed: “(a) A ceiling on budget deficits; 
(b) A freeze on, or reduction in, spending levels; (c) The removal of subsidies; (d) A 
rationalization/streamlining of government bureaucracy; (e) An increase in certain types 
of taxes and/or introduction of new taxes; and (f) Currency devaluation.”311 The imple-
mentation of these policies occurred at a time when the countries experienced eco-
nomic decline and growing poverty and hence there existed a great need for well-
functioning social services. From a human development perspective, SAPRIN points 
out, it would have been logical to offer alternatives to the decrease in government 
spending so that social spending would not have been negatively affected. However, 
the countries that are part of the SAPRI study did not have a choice.312 As a result of 
the fiscal and monetary policies employed, Ghana, Uganda and Zimbabwe experi-
enced a negative impact of reforms on access to, and quality of, education and health-
care services. This, consequently, led to a violation of the human rights to health and 
education.
3.3.1 SAPs and the Violation of the Right to Health
In terms of access to healthcare services in the three African countries studied, 
SAPRIN reports that the introduction of user fees under cost-recovery and revenue-
generating schemes has led to severe restrictions in this respect. In Zimbabwe, in or-
der to share the cost of services, the government set up user fees for healthcare bene-
fits in 1991. In many cases, patients were confronted with enormous cost increases, at 
times exceeding the figure of 1,000 per cent. Similarly, in Ghana user fees were intro-
duced at a time when workers experienced a constant decline in their wages, thus 
310 ICESCR, Art. 13.
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leaving them with even less money to spend on healthcare.313 As a result of the estab-
lishment of user fees for healthcare services and, hence, a lack of financial resources 
to afford government healthcare, many families turned to self-medication and home 
care to nurse the sick. In the case of Ghana, it has been noted that due to the initiation 
of user fees, out-patient attendance decreased by about one third. In Uganda, the in-
troduction of user fees resulted in the poor not having access to hospital care.314 The 
participants of the Uganda country study noted that “those who cannot pay for critical 
healthcare simply die.”315 Moreover, it has been found that many people do not seek 
medical care until their diseases have reached a critical status. As a consequence, 
people die of curable illnesses and/or spread them in their villages, which has led to a 
persistence of ailments such as bronchitis, pneumonia and tuberculosis.316
The situation illustrated above clearly goes against the provisions stated in Article 12 of 
the ICESCR. To begin with, Article 12(d) states that the right to health is only fully real-
ised if conditions are created that guarantee everyone medical benefits and medical 
care when falling sick. The Covenant clearly asks states parties to take steps in this 
direction.317 However, with the introduction of user fees, governments do exactly the 
opposite. They create conditions where a great number of the population, first and 
foremost the poor, are excluded from basic healthcare services, thereby violating the 
right to health as set out in the ICESCR. In addition to breaching Article 12(d), a viola-
tion of Article 12(c) can also be observed. As illustrated above, Article 12(c) of the 
ICESCR expects states parties to take steps to prevent, treat and control epidemic, 
endemic, occupational and other diseases.318 Obviously, these steps were not taken in 
the countries studied. On the contrary, due to the establishment of user fees many 
people have not been able to afford healthcare services, thus dying of various diseases 
as well as spreading them in their communities. Consequently, there is an evident 
breach of Article 12(c) of the right to health.
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A clarification on the different levels of obligation is necessary at this point. The primary 
responsibility to respect, protect and fulfil human rights lies always with the state con-
cerned in which the violation takes place, in this case Ghana, Uganda and Zim-
babwe.319 However, because it is the World Bank, which forces these countries to em-
ploy SAPs and thereby pressures them to reduce government spending in the areas of 
healthcare and education, they too, have human rights obligations. Subsequently, they
too, can be held responsible for violations of human rights. Yet, Skogly expresses very 
well that discussing the human rights responsibilities of the Bank “does not imply a 
transfer of obligations, but rather an extension of the circle of actors with recognised 
human rights obligations.”320 In this thesis, the focus is on the extension of the circle of 
actors concentrating, in particular, on the IFI of the World Bank. This approach should 
be kept in mind for the analysis offered above and the examination to follow.
Not only has the restriction on access to healthcare services led to the violation of the 
right to health, but the reduced quality of healthcare has also impacted negatively on 
the upholding of this right. Due to the cuts in government spending on healthcare, in 
Zimbabwe in the 1990s, a number of deteriorating conditions resulted in a decline in 
the quality of healthcare services. Among these were: “Reduced maintenance, delayed 
upgrades of deteriorating health facilities, shortages of equipment and essential drugs, 
and a high rate of staff attrition and loss to the private sector and abroad.”321 SAPRIN
reports a decrease in the quality of healthcare services of approximately 30 per cent in 
Zimbabwe in 1993 compared to the gains achieved in the country’s post-independence 
period. In more detail, the network has observed an increase in the “wasting and stunt-
ing” in children under five since the 1980s, as well as a proliferation of infant and child 
mortality rates. Finally, it was found that there had been a decrease in pre-natal ser-
vices and in the coverage of immunisation.322 However, Article 12(a) asks states par-
ties to the ICESCR to take steps to support the diminution of infant mortality and the 
healthy development of children.323 Once more, then, it can be witnessed that the Afri-
can states are in breach of the right to health due to the fact that they are obliged to 
employ the various measures inherent in SAPs. As a consequence, the World Bank,
319 See Skogly, The Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 34.
320 Skogly, The Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 34.
321 SAPRIN, Structural Adjustment: The SAPRI Report; The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty and 
Inequality, 192.
322 See SAPRIN, Structural Adjustment: The SAPRI Report; The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty 
and Inequality, 192.
323 See ICESCR, Art. 12(a).
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principal provider of SAPs, is also violating the right to health as stipulated in the 
ICESCR.
3.3.2 SAPs and the Violation of the Right to Education
In the area of education, again, the establishment of user fees has resulted in serious 
constraints regarding the access to this service. The reintroduction of user fees in Zim-
babwe in 1992 meant that once more money had to be paid to send children to primary 
and secondary school. With the reestablishment of these fees, both Zimbabwe and 
Ghana, experienced a dramatic increase in drop-out rates. Parents could no longer
provide for the school fees; thus, the children were pulled out to support their families 
at home. According to the SAPRI report, the drop-out rate in Ghana was about 40 per 
cent.324 As a consequence, the network declares, “user fees have led to increasing 
inequalities, both between and within communities, as the poor are left behind.”325 Con-
trary to what has been explored above, Article 13 (a)(b) of the ICESCR states that in 
order to achieve the full realisation of the right to education, states recognise that pri-
mary education should be free for all and secondary education should progressively 
become free of charge.326 Instead of providing for free education in primary and secon-
dary schools, the governments of these countries have reintroduced user fees for edu-
cation services so as to comply with the requirements set out in the World Bank’s 
SAPs. Consequently, a breach of Article 13(a)(b) of the International Covenant by the 
governments and the Bank can be confirmed.
In addition to restricted access to education services, the decrease in government 
spending in this area has led to a deteriorating quality of education. The following con-
ditions worsened the quality of education services: “inadequate infrastructure and the 
lack of educational materials and supplies, as well as declining salaries and insufficient 
training for teachers.”327 Compared with Article 13 of the ICESCR, it can be observed 
that Article 13(e) has not been adhered to by the governments and, hence, the World 
Bank. This article asks states parties to recognise that “the material conditions of 
teaching staff shall be continuously improved.”328 Yet, there has been a lack of educa-
324 See SAPRIN, Structural Adjustment: The SAPRI Report; The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty 
and Inequality, 183, 186.
325 See SAPRIN, Structural Adjustment: The SAPRI Report; The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty 
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327 SAPRIN, Structural Adjustment: The SAPRI Report; The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty and 
Inequality, 190.
328 See ICESCR, Art. 13(e).
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tional materials and supplies. Consequently, it can be established once again that the 
governments and, therefore, the Bank find themselves in breach of the right to educa-
tion.
The analysis presented above gives the reader a good idea of how the World Bank’s 
SAPs, with the inherent request to decrease government spending for social services,
has led to a violation of the rights to health and education in numerous ways. Overall, 
SAPRIN has observed that the introduction of these measures has resulted in an ex-
pansion and an intensification of poverty and increased social segregation.329 The net-
work’s preoccupation with this topic over a five-year time frame has led it to conclude 
that “if there is to be any hope for meaningful development in the countries of the South 
and for the sustained reduction of poverty and inequality, the Western-inspired and 
imposed doctrines of structural adjustment and neoliberal economics must go.”330 Yet, 
SAPRIN also notices that the doctrine of structural adjustment continues to be em-
ployed as a precondition for lending offered by aid agencies such as the World Bank.331
However, it should again be acknowledged that the World Bank has started to react to 
the criticisms triggered by the deployment of SAPs. One of the most recent inventions 
to halt the negative impacts of these programmes is the utilisation by Third World gov-
ernments of so-called poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). According to this 
mechanism, developing countries have to provide national development plans in the 
form of PRSPs that focus on poverty reduction in order to receive loans from the Bank 
or other aid agencies. The aim is to increase developing states’ participation in the 
drawing up of poverty reduction strategies, which has been completely lacking in re-
gard to SAPs. Nonetheless, Frankovits as well as SAPRIN point out that the newly es-
tablished PRSPs have undergone the same criticism as SAPs. Most significantly, and 
despite having claimed otherwise, PRSPs are devoid of extensive and meaningful par-
ticipation.332 Moreover, this newest version of a development and poverty reduction 
framework lacks any sign of accountability, on the side of the individual developing 
329 See SAPRIN, Structural Adjustment: The SAPRI Report; The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty 
and Inequality, 200.
330 SAPRIN, Structural Adjustment: The SAPRI Report; The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty and 
Inequality, intro.
331 See SAPRIN, Structural Adjustment: The SAPRI Report; The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty 
and Inequality, 4.
332 Interviewee Killander does not share this opinion. He believes: “To treat SAPs and PRSPs as the same 
with regard to participation I don’t think is justified. I think the PRSPs have come quite some way in ad-
dressing the problems of the SAPs of the 80’s.” Killander, interview carried out by email, 8 May, 2006.
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governments but also on the side of the World Bank.333 These facts lead Sengupta to 
declare that in many cases the basic ingredients of PRSPs appear to be traditional 
SAPs with little change.334 “In short,” SAPRIN concludes, “the IMF, the World Bank and 
their most powerful board members still determine national economic frameworks, 
while the majority of populations, particularly the poor, as well as important economic 
sectors, continue to suffer the effects of these policies.”335
Having established why and how the World Bank’s SAPs violate international human 
rights standards and principles, it has yet not been explained how this issue relates to 
the RBA to development in general, and this approach to NEPAD in particular. The 
question needs to be addressed as to why exactly the Bank’s SAPs are the major eco-
nomic impediment to implementing an RBA to NEPAD.
3.3.3 SAPs and the RBA to Development
To answer this question, it might first be helpful to remind the reader of the definition of 
the RBA. As explained in chapters 1 and 2, the approach incorporates the standards 
and principles of the international human rights system into the plans, policies and 
processes of development programming. In other words, development programming 
has to be carried out in such a way that it adheres to international human rights stan-
dards while at the same time does not ignore human rights principles such as participa-
tion, accountability or non-discrimination. However, as explored above neither SAPs
nor the programme’s new version of PRSPs are based on human rights standards and 
principles. The sections on SAPs and the rights to health and education have shown 
that these adjustment programmes do not adhere to the human rights standards 
spelled out in the articles of the ICESCR. In addition, as mentioned earlier in this chap-
ter, SAPs and PRSPs both fail to incorporate human rights principles such as participa-
tion or accountability. As Sengupta points out regarding the development frameworks 
of SAPs and PRSPs and their link to international human rights: 
The most obvious gap is the failure to draw concrete links between the 
development frameworks and human rights standards. In particular, the 
notion that the objectives of the right to development are to be treated 
as entitlements or rights that are legitimately claimed by individuals 
333 See Frankovits, “Rules to Live by: The Human Rights Approach to Development,” 10. SAPRIN, Struc-
tural Adjustment: The SAPRI Report; The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty and Inequality, 4.
334 See Sengupta 2002: 16.
335 SAPRIN, Structural Adjustment: The SAPRI Report; The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty and 
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69
holds limited currency among donors such as IMF and World Bank. 
While rights-based language is cautiously referred to in some official 
documents, the human rights approach to development is not treated as 
a core principle (emphasis added).336
Consequently, because SAPs and PRSPs are not based on international human rights 
standards and principles, they do not fulfil the requirements of an RBA to development. 
It follows that an RBA to NEPAD cannot be implemented as long as the World Bank’s 
SAPs and PRSPs fail to adhere to these standards and principles and, thus, lead to the 
violation of people’s human rights in developing countries. However, this is still the 
case and there does not exist any evidence of significant change in the near future. As 
a result, it can be confirmed that the World Bank’s application of SAPs and PRSPs in 
African countries constitutes a major obstacle to applying an RBA to NEPAD.
3.3.4 The Two Levels of Responsibility: International Society and NEPAD
Although the above analysis focuses primarily on the human rights obligations of the 
World Bank, there exists a second level of responsibility that needs to be explored. The 
first level of accountability rests with international society, as has been exemplified 
through the particular case of the Bank. The second level of responsibility lies with 
NEPAD. While international society, including IGOs such as the World Bank as well as 
governments, can be held accountable for having introduced and subsequently em-
ployed the doctrine of structural adjustment in developing countries, NEPAD holds re-
sponsibility for the continuous deployment of SAPs on its continent. The principal 
NEPAD document when discussing the impoverishment of the African state admits: 
“The structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s provided only a partial solution. 
They promoted reforms that tended to remove serious price distortions, but gave in-
adequate attention to the provision of social services. As a consequence, only a few 
countries managed to achieve sustainable higher growth under these programmes.”337
However, despite NEPAD’s criticism of SAPs and the realisation that these policies
have mainly failed Africa, in another paragraph of the document, NEPAD affirms its 
future collaboration with IFIs, the main providers of these policies. It states: “The vari-
ous partnerships between Africa and the industrialised countries on the one hand, and 
336 UN Economic and Social Council, Arjun Sengupta, Fifth Report of the Independent Expert on the Right 
to Development (Geneva, 18 September 2002), E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/6, para. 49.
337 HSGIC, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), para. 24.
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multilateral institutions on the other, will be maintained.”338 There are quite a few schol-
ars who disapprove of NEPAD’s will to cooperate with the IFIs and, thus, its will to sup-
port the doctrine of neoliberalism.339 As Gabriel emphasises: “Der Armutskomplex im 
Südlichen Afrika ist untrennbar mit den Problemen des Welthandels, der globalen Fi-
nanzen und Herrschaft verbunden. Wenn es in der Politik der Armutsbekämpfung nicht 
zu einer Transformation weg von den makroökonomischen Zielvorgaben à la IWF hin 
zu sozialökonomischen Zielvorgaben kommt, wird das Südliche Afrika immer weiter in 
die Armutsfalle sinken“ (Poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is inseparably linked to the 
problems of world trade, of global finances and global rule. If there is not going to be a 
transformation in the politics of fighting poverty away from the macroeconomic aims à 
la IMF to social-economic goals, sub-Saharan Africa will become increasingly impover-
ished)340 (translation own). Although NEPAD is being heavily criticised for its coopera-
tion with the IFIs, it does not change its neoliberal approach to development. Conse-
quently, it is not just the World Bank that can be held accountable for violating African 
countries’ human rights through the employment of adjustment programmes. Equally 
important, because NEPAD supports the IFIs’ deployment of SAPs on the African con-
tinent, the development programme, as well, is responsible for human rights violations.
This chapter has confirmed the World Bank’s legal obligation towards international hu-
man rights. In addition, it has been established that the Bank’s SAPs form a principal 
economic impediment to implementing an RBA to NEPAD. The question necessarily 
arises as to what can be done to overcome this hindrance. Chapter 4 will investigate 
this query in more detail, thereby examining the feasibility of applying an RBA to 
NEPAD.
338 HSGIC, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), para. 187.
339 See African Civil Society, “African Civil Society Declaration on NEPAD,” 
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Chapter 5
5. Conclusion
The last chapter commences by summarising the research conducted. The main 
arguments of the thesis are reiterated and, where necessary, the counter-arguments 
are repeated. Following this, the methodology employed is critiqued. General 
drawbacks and advantages of the methodology are highlighted; moreover, the linkage 
to the theoretical perspective of critical theory is restated. Thirdly, the conclusion offers 
an assessment of the theoretical framework applied in this thesis. An introduction to 
potential future research projects follows before the final section provides an outlook on 
the near future in this field of studies.
5.1 Summary of the Research Conducted
This thesis assessed the World Bank’s SAPs as the principle economic impediment to 
implementing an RBA to NEPAD. In doing so, the feasibility for applying this approach 
to Africa’s development programme was evaluated. One of the main assumptions 
underlying this project is the belief that the RBA to development is the best approach 
currently available to pursue the cause of sustainable human, social and economic 
development in developing countries. Consequently, the literature on the RBA was the 
first aspect to be reviewed in chapter 2. Apart from the RBA’s evolution and main 
components, this section covered the approach’s advantages and drawbacks in detail. 
It was revealed that critics saw one of the main shortcomings in the fact that the RBA is 
not the solution to all development problems; major difficulties nevertheless remain.
379 However, while proponents of the approach agreed, they also pointed out that this 
was not the RBA’s goal. Instead, the fundamental idea of this approach is that it 
provides a map and a toolbox for how to engage in development work in a human 
rights-friendly manner.380 In terms of the RBA’s advantages, the website of the 
UNHCHR outlines a great number of them. For example, the UNHCHR refers to such 
benefits as enhanced accountability; active, free and meaningful participation and 
empowerment.381 To support these theoretical advantages, the last section introduced 
379 See Sano, “Development and Human Rights: The Necessary, but Partial Integration of Human Rights 
and Development,” 751. Hamm, “A Human Rights Approach to Development,” 1012. Uvin, Human Rights 
and Development, 166.
380 See Uvin, Human Rights and Development, 166. Frankovits, “Introduction,” 5.
381 See UNHCHR, “Rights-Based Approaches,” http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right.html (accessed 
February 1, 2005).
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a UNICEF case study in Peru where the RBA was successfully employed. The 
application of this approach significantly decreased Andean women’s high maternal 
mortality rate in this country.382
The second issue reviewed in chapter 2 was the African development programme 
NEPAD. An overview of NEPAD and its base document was followed by general 
criticisms concerning this programme. Yet, the main part of this section was dedicated 
to exploring NEPAD’s lack of an RBA to development. To create a foundation for 
discussion, in the beginning it was highlighted that there exist a range of legal 
obligations for NEPAD to acknowledge and comply with the international human rights 
framework. These include, among others, international human rights conventions such 
as the ICESCR and the ICCPR, as well as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.383 However, despite these legal responsibilities, the African development 
programme fails to include human rights language in its base document.384 In a number 
of examples it was revealed that NEPAD lacks the standards and principles that 
constitute the RBA to development. For instance, it was explained that the programme 
falls far short of adhering to the human rights principle of public participation. African 
civil society was not consulted during the formulation phase of NEPAD, which left the 
development programme with the accusation of following a top-down approach.385
Moreover, the critical issue of the HIV/AIDS epidemic was only poorly discussed and it 
barely received any attention on the NEPAD agenda.386 Finally, the aspect of gender 
inequality underwent a similar fate within the programme. A comprehensive gender 
382 See UNICEF, A Review of a UNICEF Country Programme Based on Human Rights: The Case of Peru. 
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5.
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analysis was absent for a long time.387 These indifferences were observed despite the 
fact that HIV/AIDS as well as women’s rights are both directly linked to the enormous 
problems of conflict, poverty and marginalisation in Africa. Again, these rather 
theoretical listings were complemented by a case study. It was exposed how NEPAD 
failed to adhere to the RBA to development during the Zimbabwean elections in 2001. 
President Mugabe’s leading political party refused to respect the global standards of 
democracy by holding illegitimate elections. Despite the obviousness of this offence, 
the South African and the Nigerian delegation declared the elections as fair, open and 
free.388 Both, South Africa and Nigeria, are among the five countries which drafted 
NEPAD in 2001. In an attempt to provide the reader with an inclusive analysis, it was 
acknowledged that improvements had been achieved since the inauguration of the 
African development programme. Not only has NEPAD made HIV/AIDS a principal 
issue in all its programmes, it has established a gender unit to address women’s rights 
in all their aspects.389 Nevertheless, the second chapter ended on the note that human 
rights language remains mainly absent on the NEPAD agenda. Consequently, it was 
declared that the African programme continues to lack an RBA to development.
What then, are the reasons for NEPAD being short of such a development approach? 
Chapter 3 identified the World Bank’s SAPs as the major economic obstacle to 
implementing an RBA to NEPAD. In a preliminary step, the IFI’s international legal 
obligations towards human rights were discussed. In doing so, the section examined 
the Bank’s ‘Political Prohibition’ Article, the World Bank-United Nations Relationship 
Agreement and the World Bank-ICESCR membership debate. It was proven that the 
IFI is legally obliged to respect, protect and fulfil international human rights. In a second 
move, SAPs, as employed by the Bank, were introduced. It was highlighted that the 
employment of SAPs has led to the violation of CP as well as ESC rights in developing 
countries.390 This study focused on a particular report developed in collaboration with
the World Bank and SAPRIN to describe the experienced infringements. The 
387 See FIDH, A Human Rights Approach to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and 
the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 98. Manby, “The African Union, NEPAD, and Human Rights: 
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publication revealed that cuts in government spending as requested in SAPs have led 
to the violation of the rights to health and to education.391 Consequently, it was argued 
that the World Bank, as the principal provider of SAPs, is responsible for these abuses. 
Although the IFI has begun to incorporate human rights into its work, major problems 
persist to this day. In a last step, it was explained how exactly the Bank’s SAPs are the 
main impediment to implementing an RBA to NEPAD: these adjustment programmes
are not founded on international human rights standards and principles. Therefore, they 
do not adhere to the guidelines of the RBA to development. However, because the 
World Bank employs SAPs, the rights approach cannot be applied to NEPAD. As a 
result, the IFI’s programmes constitute a major obstacle to this implementation.
The fourth chapter assessed the feasibility for overcoming this impediment. A first 
assessment outlined the actions required by the World Bank to change the current 
situation. These actions suggested by SAPRIN included the elimination of cuts in 
government spending as well as budget increases in healthcare and education.392 Yet, 
it was shown that the Bank has not carried out the network’s recommendations. 
Instead, the World Bank has continued the employment of human rights-devoid SAPs 
up to this day.393 Consequently, the likelihood for implementing an RBA to NEPAD was
deemed unrealistic. In a second assessment, Held’s regime of liberal international 
sovereignty was applied to this case. This regime has only a limited impact on the 
economic sphere in international relations. In turn, this indicates that there are no 
systematic means to curtail sources of economic power, such as the World Bank.394
Thus, it was argued that not the IFI’s SAPs but the regime is the principal obstacle to 
successfully applying an RBA to NEPAD. Held’s framework can be used to identify the 
principal underlying obstacle to overcoming the first impediment. With these two 
hindrances in existence, implementing an RBA to NEPAD appears even more 
unrealistic. Nevertheless, the fourth chapter also introduced Held’s solutions of how to 
address the economic disparities associated with the regime of liberal international 
sovereignty. The scholar believes in the politics of global social democracy;395
therefore, his social democratic agenda for economic globalisation and global 
391 See SAPRIN, Structural Adjustment: The SAPRI Report; The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty 
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economic governance was presented. Among other suggestions, Held recommends an 
international review of the performance of the IFIs, which were created more than 50 
years ago.396 Despite the desperate need for such a re-examination, it was affirmed 
that his recommendations are insufficient and underspecified. In particular, Slaughter 
and Hale formulated this point. They state that while thinkers like Held have progressed 
immensely in the theoretical conceptualisation of the world’s challenges, practical 
policies to tackle them are still largely missing. What is needed is the discovery of 
innovative and realistic policies and techniques to practically address these 
problems.397 This seems to be the principal challenge before us. Once this challenge 
has been mastered, the solutions to some of the world’s most pressing problems may 
be within reach. This also applies to the underlying impediment to implementing an 
RBA to NEPAD. It, then, has a chance to be addressed successfully, thereby turning 
the feasibility of implementation into reality. As a consequence, Africa might witness 
progress regarding its own sustainable human, social and economic development and 
the world may experience increased peace and security.
5.2 Drawbacks and Advantages of the Methodology Employed
Choosing a qualitative approach to research automatically brings with it certain 
drawbacks and advantages. However, there still exist a large number of political 
scientists, mainly positivists, who generally question the importance of qualitative 
methods. As Fiona Devine remarks: “They doubt the value of qualitative techniques 
and the need to be reflexive about issues of method in the discipline.”398 What exactly 
is it about qualitative research that they criticise? Three broad issues of critique, among 
others, are mentioned below: objectivity, interpretation, and generalisability.399 In terms 
of the first two aspects, qualitative research is often criticised for its lack of objectivity
due to interpretation. Quantitative researchers are of the opinion that there has to be 
distance and objectivity regarding the material studied – be it people, documents or 
activities. They see themselves as unbiased, discreet observers who comment only on 
what can be monitored. Hence, they do not believe in the usefulness of 
interpretation.400 In regard to generalisability, qualitative research is often dismissed 
396 See Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus, 68. 
Held, “Globalization: The Dangers and the Answers,” 32.
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due to its lack thereof. Quantitative researchers argue that because qualitative 
research focuses on particular settings, documents or people, a study’s findings cannot 
be generalised – one of the goals of quantitative research.401
While these criticisms are acknowledged by the author, it has to be stated that they
approach the topic from an incorrect angle. As Devine expresses so well: “What is a 
valid method depends on the aims and objectives of a research project.”402
Consequently, since the goal was not to be objective, to confine oneself to observation 
and to generalise, these theoretical drawbacks do not apply to the methodology 
chosen. The aim was to critically analyse and interpret the documents and interviews, 
the methodology based on the theoretical perspective of critical theory. This process 
provided a useful account of people’s and organisations’ experiences, opinions, beliefs 
and values regarding the implementation of an RBA to NEPAD.
Nevertheless, in regard to the interview carried out by email, a few ‘real’ disadvantages 
were observed. Firstly, while it was anticipated to interview NEPAD officials, this, 
unfortunately, did not occur. The staff failed to respond to the inquiries sent to them. As 
a result, the thesis lacks important information from one of its fundamental sources. It is 
very likely that opinions by NEPAD officials would have provided valuable additional, 
maybe even deviating insights into the topic studied. Secondly, the interview
undertaken lacked flexibility. Sending questions via email takes away the possibility of 
reframing questions, of expanding on certain issues and of verifying what has been 
said. Therefore, at times, the returned responses were deficient in detail and focus. 
Yet, this did not detract from the general advantage of the methodology of interviewing. 
The author was able to secure unique information otherwise unobtainable. For 
example, some of the views expressed in the interview had not been mentioned in the 
documents analysed earlier. Thus, they represented a significant addition to the 
research conducted. Moreover, it was possible to ask the professional the research 
question directly, thereby obtaining exclusive answers not existing in the literature. 
Finally, the scholar’s first-hand experience in the subject added a very valuable 
practical perspective to the matter investigated. Similarly, the methodology of 
document analysis had a number of advantages: to begin with, the various documents 
sighted were accessible at all times, thereby adding to research convenience and 
401 See Devine, “Qualitative Methods,” 207.
402 Devine, “Qualitative Methods,” 205.
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effectiveness. Also, documents such as reports, book chapters and articles 
represented “data that are thoughtful, in that participants [authors] have given attention 
to compiling.”403 Hence, their analysis and interpretation was more straightforward than 
it would have been with other sources. Finally, through the collection of numerous 
documents, the research carried out was approached from all perspectives, thus 
avoiding a selective and incomplete interpretation of the subject. However, it is 
acknowledged that there are problems associated with relying heavily on only one 
report – the SAPRI report. Above all, depending on one source leads to the exclusion 
of all other sources and, therefore, to the elimination of important additional 
information. Yet, it needs to be kept in mind that the source in question consists not 
only of one author but of NGOs, developing country governments and, most 
significantly, of the World Bank itself. Therefore, it is argued that the SAPRI report 
analyses the problem adequately. Taken together, the methodology chosen greatly 
contributed to successfully applying the theoretical perspective of critical theory to this 
dissertation.
5.3 Assessment of the Theoretical Framework Employed
Despite containing a weakness, Held’s theoretical framework of competing conceptions 
of sovereignty matched the thesis excellently. The only drawback encountered relates 
to the fact that global social democracy, the scholar’s solution for overcoming the 
problems associated with the regime of liberal international sovereignty, is flawed. The 
author completely agrees with Slaughter and Hale that Held’s recommendations 
regarding a social democratic agenda for economic globalisation and global economic 
governance lack innovative and realistic governance techniques. While theoretically his 
suggestions are very advanced and at the forefront of global governance debates, 
practically they are often insufficient, underspecified or politically unrealistic. Thus, this 
weakness represents an actual limitation to Held’s overall framework. Nevertheless, 
this flaw does not undermine his approach as such. It is believed that Held’s
conceptualisation of liberal international sovereignty gives a factual account of the 
enormous force of economic power in international relations. Moreover, the author 
shares Held’s opinion that systematic means to address the sources of economic might
do not exist. Therefore, the application of his framework to this thesis is very 
appropriate. If Held’s theoretical conceptualisations were more realistic and innovative, 
403 John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches. 2nd 
ed. London: SAGE Publications, 2003.
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his framework would be ideal for successfully addressing today’s international 
challenges of globalisation. However, at present this itself seems to be a key challenge 
requiring further study.
5.4 Potential Future Research Projects
Due to the specificity of this thesis, a number of potential future research projects can 
be derived from this dissertation. The thesis has examined just one of the principal 
economic impediments to implementing an RBA to NEPAD. However, apart from the 
World Bank’s SAPs, there exist other economic obstacles that could be studied. To 
begin with, it should be kept in mind that the Bank is not the only provider of SAPs. The 
IMF as well as individual governments also employ SAPs in developing countries. 
Therefore, one could investigate their roles in more detail in comparison with the 
politics of the World Bank. Other aspects worthwhile examining are, for example, the 
matter of official development assistance (ODA) and international trade issues.
Whereas the ODA provided by industrialised states still falls far short of what has been 
officially agreed upon,404 the international terms of trade continue to favour the 
developed countries.405 It can be argued that, like SAPs, both these aspects block the 
integration of an RBA to NEPAD. How exactly they do so would be worthwhile 
investigating to receive a complete picture of the existing economic hindrances. 
Moreover, impediments including political, cultural, law-related and technical obstacles 
can also have a negative influence on this implementation. For instance, African 
political leadership has been a huge problem in many African states in the past, and it 
remains one in some African countries today. NEPAD itself agrees that weak African 
states and their economies “were aggravated by poor leadership, corruption and bad 
governance in many countries.”406 Poor leadership, corruption and bad governance are 
closely related to the violation of human rights in development, which in turn signals the 
non-adherence to an RBA. Therefore, the feasibility of the application of an RBA to 
NEPAD can be further assessed by analysing this principal political impediment. 
Additional obstacles could be mentioned; however, it should be clear by now that only 
the examination of all hindrances would offer a comprehensive assessment of the 
likelihood of implementing an RBA to NEPAD. Future research projects could focus on 
this extensive investigation.
404 See Cohn, Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice, 405. 
405 See UN General Assembly, Kofi Annan, New Partnership for Africa’s Development: Third Consolidated 
Report on Progress in Implementation and International Support, 1 August 2005, A/60/178, 16.
406 NEPAD, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), para. 22.
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In addition to the inspection of these impediments, it is of great significance to explore
the problems that currently block the successful functioning of the regime of liberal 
international sovereignty. The focus here is on the lack of discovery of innovative and 
realistic policies and techniques, which could resolve the world’s challenges. For 
example, there do not exist inventive and realistic procedures that indicate how to 
address Held’s recommendation of an international review of the functioning of IFIs. 
Yet, in this case a theoretical notion is insufficient without its practical counterpart. Only 
the actual discovery of such procedures would help to put into practice a re-
examination of the Bretton Woods system, thereby attending to one of the world’s 
contemporary crises. Again, future research projects could concentrate on this issue, 
attempting to locate innovative and realistic policies and techniques to tackle universal 
challenges.
5.5 Outlook on the Near Future
The conclusion of this thesis has been that major economic impediments exist, which 
keep NEPAD from implementing an RBA. Unless these and other obstacles are 
addressed, both by the African development programme and international society, an 
RBA will not be integrated. However, because the preceding research has shown that
progress in this area is rather slow, implementation appears unrealistic at this point. 
Therefore, it is anticipated that the African population and, specifically, the poor and 
insecure, will continue to suffer from human rights violations due to the employment of 
SAPs. In particular, Africans face various infringements on the rights to health and 
education. Moreover, sustainable human, social and economic development in Africa 
remains jeopardised, thus postponing peace and security in the region and beyond. 
Nevertheless, the RBA movement is not motionless. On the contrary, it is vibrant and 
growing. More and more scholars and professionals point to the diverse advantages of 
the RBA and they support its utilisation. In addition, initial practical experiences 
underscore its effectiveness. Increasingly, industrialised countries incorporate this 
approach into their development work. As a result, the RBA movement could become a 
strong counterforce, which slowly undermines the impediments currently in place. 
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